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Summary findings
Jamaica's  telecnmmunications  sector today is much more  years is traceable to intense contracting  problems
dynamic  than it was before and provides much  better  between firms or interest  groups and  the government.
service. There  is widespread skepticism about the current  Attempts to resolve these contracting  problems  have
regulatory  framework,  which is criticized for  continuously  constrained  the  government's  (and firms')
encouraging  a tight telecommunications  monopoly,  little  ability to implement efficient pricing schemes.
administrative  discretion,  and continuous  price  In the abstract, Jamaica's  regulatory  strucwre  looks
adjustments to satisfy what  many see as a high rate of  inefficient. In the context  of Jamaica's  political system,
return  requirement.  But Spiller and Sampson suggest that  politics, judiciary, bureaucracy,  and  interest groups, the
the  regulatory  framework  is a "second-best"  alternative,  regulatory  framework developed  in the late 1980s
a pragmatic  response to Jamaica's  institutional  realities.  emerges as a fairly pragmatic,  welfare-improving  set of
Spiller and Sampson analyze why the reforms  of the  policies.
late 1980s took the  form they did, and whether  they  Perhaps it could have been better,  but its current
could have been better.  They find that the changing  design renects  basic commitment  problems Jamaica's
nature of regulatory  institutions,  ownership  government  institutions  have with public utilities,
arrangements,  and  sector performance  in the past 50  conclude Spiller and Sampson.
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Bank, 1818 HIStreetNW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Bill  Moore, roomN9-05S,extension  38526 (78 pages).  October
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I.  Introduction.
1.  The  Jamaican  telecommunications  sector  has been  subject  to a massive  reorganization  since
the late 1980s  in both its structure  and regulatory  framework.  Whereas  today  a single  private  company
operates  subject  to a regulatory  framework  characterized  by a license  that substantially  limits  both  the
discretion  of the government  and the pricing  ability  of the company,  just five years  ago it was composed
of a domestc  and  an intemafional  company,  both  publicly  owned,  both  subject  to a regulatory
framework  characterized  by almost  total  ministerial  discretion,
2.  Most  observers  will agree  that today's  telecommunications  sector  in Jamaica  is a much  more
dynamic  one, providing  Jamaicans  with a much  better  service  than  anytime  before. On the other  hand,
there  is widespread  skeptcism  about  the benefits  of the current  regulatory  framework:  tight monopoly
over  all telecommunications  (including  equipment  supply),  very little  administrative  discretion,
continuous  price adjustments  to satisfy,  what  is seen  by many,  as a high rate of return  requirement
This paper  attempts  to provide  an answer  to why the reforms  of the late 1980s  took the  form they did,
and  to whether  they  could  have  been  done  any  better. In attempting  to answer  these  questions,  there
is a need  to understand  the workings  of the political  institubons  in Jamaica,  the nature  of the
contracting  problems  that may  have given  raise to the need  for govemment  intervention  in the sector,
ant how the contracting  problems  are affected  by the politics  and the political  structure  and institions
of Jamaica.
3.  The analysis  that we develop  below  suggests  that the intensity  of contracting  problems  between
the govemment  and interest  groups,  and  between  the  firm(s)  and the govemment  explain  much  of the
evolution  of the regulatory  institutions,  ownership  arrangements  and performance  in the Jamaican
telecommunications  sector  over  the last fifty years. Furthermore,  attempts  to resolve  contracting
problems  between  the government  and the firms  and between  the govemment  and the interest  groups,
have  continuously  constrained  the ability  of the govemment  (and  of the firms)  to implement  efficientPag  2
pricing  schemes.  Thus,  a major  policy  implication  trom this paper  is that while,  in the abstract,  this
regulatory  structure  looks  quite  ineffident,  once  te  insttutional  characteristics  of Jamaica  (its political
system,  its politics  and interest  groups,  the role of the judiciary  and of the bureaucracy)  are understood,
the regulatory  framework  developed  in the late 1980s  can be  seen as. perhaps,  a third  best  altemative.
While  it could  certainly  have been  designed  better,  its current  features  respond  to basic  commitment
problems  that Jamaica's  governmental  institutions  have  in their  relations  to sectors  characterized  by
large  sunk  investments  with  a domestic  consumption  base (i.e,  public  utilities). In other  words,  the
politics  and institutional  structure  of Jamaica  generate  an unavoidable  tradeoff  between  providing
incentives  for private  sector  development  and growth,  and implementing  the mainstitutional,*  theoretical
first  or even  second  best regulatory  policies.
4.  Jamaica  is a fascinating  case  to explore  the roles  ot institutions  because  in the 50 years  since
Jamaicans  were granted  the right  to vote  mhere  have  been  several  important  regulatory  instiutional
changes  accompanied  by changes  in  the performance  of the sector. Not only  has Jamaica
experienced  different  regulatory  regimes,  it also  has experienced  different  ownership  arrangements  -
from private  ownership,  to public  and  to private  again. The  variety  of regulatory  instituons and
ownership  arrangements,  coupled  with the extraordinary  stability of Jamaica's political system, provides,
then,  an opportunity  to explore,  at least  qualitatively,  some  of the main  hypotheses  of this research
project Table 1 provides  the key periods  and events  in the evolution  of Jamaican  regulatory
institutions  and ownefship  arrangements  conceming  both  the domestic  and the intemational  telephone
companies  (JTC - Jamaica  Telephone  Company,  and,  since 1971,  JAMIINTEL,  the  Jamaica
Intemabonal  Telecommunicatiosns  sic.,  respectively).
5.  The main  hypothesis  that  we will try to provide  evidence  about  in this paper  is that given  the
nature  of Jamaica's  politcs and  political  system,  a legislation  based  regulatory  mechanism  (e.g.,  U.S.
regulatory  style)  constitutes  an implicit  contract  that is too flexible  and incomplete  to pmvide  thePaoe  3
required  safeguards  tor investmnent  and growth. Instead,  regulatory  mechanisms  based  on specif  long
term contracts  between  the govemment  and the companies  may, it properly  designed,  provide  such
safeguards.  These  long  term contracts,  however,  cannot  be designed  to be fully  contngent. As a
consequence,  they  will necessarily  contain  ex-ante  rigidities  and inefficiencies.
6.  Decentalized  constraints  on regulatory  agencies  or ministerial  departnents  are usually  not
binding  in Jamaica  as its Parliamentary  system  with  two strong  and competitive  parties,  assures  the
party  in power  full control  over  legislation.  As a consequence,  regulatory  laws,  either  sector  (e.g.  the
Electricity  Act, the Telephone  Law)  or agency  specific  (e.g. the  Jamaica  Public  Utilities  Act)  will usually
not serve  as ex-ante  constraints  on the administration/regulators.  Thus.  for example,  a ruling  by the
Courts  that a partieular  administrative  decision  violates  the statute  can be overturned  by appropriate
legisla2ion  during  the samne  administrabon.  On the otheSr  hand,  operabing  licenses  are  contracts
between  the govemment  and  the company. While  the govemment  can  change  the law,  it cannot
unilaterally  alter  the terns of the contract Furthermore,  because  of the nature  of Jamaica's  Courts,
independent,  with long  lasting  tenure  and  with a final appeal  level at the Privy  Council  in London,  they
can be called  upon  to determine  alleged  violations  of the contract  by either  party.  To be sure,  specific
long  term contracts  between  the govemment  and firms  are not the only  feasible  ways  of restraining
administrative  discretion. Nevertheless,  as we will show below,  they have  been  the most  important
instrument  used  throughout  the last  fifty years. Thus,  in trying  to provide  an assessment  of whether  the
current  regulatory  and ownership  regime  could  have  been  designed  better,  an understanding  of both
the reasons  for the prominent  use of this particular  type of legal  form and of its consequences  is
required.Pqm 4
7.  Both govemments and firms have seen the importance  of these regulatory instruments  and
they have been used during different periods with different results.'  A major result of our work is that
the nature ot those licenses, given  Jamaica's politcal structure and politcs, have been key
determinants  of the performance  of the industry. In particular,  we will find that the sector developed
relatively  well during the periods of time when the licenses constrained the ability of govemment  to set
rates with political considerations  in mind (beiore  independence  and after 1987).  On the other hand,
the formalistic  but substantively  unconstrained  regulatory  structure defined in the 1966 Public Utility Act,
under which the 1966  domestic license was granted,  set the stage for the large extent of discrebon
taken by the newly created regulatory  commission. Such regulatory  flexibility increased the contracting
costs between  the government  and the company,  triggering the eventual sell-out of the domestic
company  to the govemment  in 1975.
II. Political Institutions  and their ImplIcatfons for Telecommunications.
B.  There are three major reasons  why legislation-based  regulatory schemes do not provide
enough  commitment  power in Jamaica: first, Jamaican political  structure (a strong two party
parliamentary  system) is such that the party in govemment has the ability to unilaterally  change laws;
second.  Jamaican  social structure and the political bases  of its two main partes imply that the pricing of
domestic  telecommunications  is a highly political issue;  and finally, while the judiciary can and does
uphold contracts,  it has a limited ability to uphuld the original  legislative intent against the wishes of the
current  administration. As a consequence,  legislation-based  regulations  will tend to be unstable, and
altemative institutions  have to be developed  to provide stability and credibility to regulatory
arrangements.
'  Sharehold.rs agreemrents  betwoen  the private  investors  and  the government  have also been used as regulatory  safeguards.
Cable & Wireless  and the governm  oi Jwnaica (GOJ) used  shareholders'  agreements  to regulae their reation in JAMINTEL  (in
1971).  and again  conmering  the regulalion  of T.lecommunictions of Jamaica  (TOJ) in 1987.  The second shareholders'  agreemnt
was eeritually written  inbt the licenses  givn  to TOJ to operafe  both  ohe  domestic  and inermational  communicaions  networkPage  5
TABLE  I
KEY  EPISODES  IN JAMAICA'S  TELECOMMUNICAllONS  SECTOR
Period  Regulatory  lnatituton/OwnershipAEvmnt
*  Prt-1962  - TecommuruicaDons  Policy  Under  Coloinal  Rule
- All Island  License  (domostic  operaIons  license)  granted  in 1945  to the  Jamaican  Telephone
Company,  with  the Telephone  & General  Trust (T&GT),  a British  Concern  being  the majority
shwaholder.
* License  requies:
specific  minimum  returns
use  at ad-Hoc  Rate  Boards
Court  enforcement  of Licanso
* Private  ownership  of domestic  and international  companies
* Modest  but contdnued  growth  In  service
*  Independence  *  Issuing  ot New  Licenses  to JrC and  the  Cremdon  of the  JPUC;  1962-1966
1962-1967  Requirement  of  Jamalcanizatlon  of ownewhip
* New  License  in 1966:
specifies  nmaimum  rate  of raturn
rqulation  by a new  independent  and  permanent,  commission  (the  Jamaican  Pubic  Utilies
Commission)
promotes  peacipation  by interest  groups
- requires  Jamricanization  by 1971
The  Takeoer of  JTC  by Condn  tnfa  Telephorn  Coanpany  1967
* CTC  agrees  to:
- terms  of 1966  license
- specific  expansion  and  financing  plan
- extant pricing levels
* Stagnation  of Serice
*  1968-1975  * 7he  JPUC  and  the Qual-Expropraion  of  JTCs Assets
- Absence  ot judicial  review
Cration of JAMINTEL  (1971):  a joint venrure  between  Cable and Wireless  (a Briah
govemmert  owned  company)  and GOJ to take over C&W (West Indies) internatonal
communicatioans  acities (and  International  communications  operating  license)  in Jamaica.
*  1975-1976  - The  Takeover  of  JrC (i9YS Transfer  of ownership  of  JTC  to the Government
-Disbandment  of JPUC
-Regulation  by  the Mnisry oD  Public  Utilities  and  Transport
*  1973-1985  -Introducdton  of International  Direct  Dialing
Boom in te  Profita ky of Interional  Communications  end  the Beginning  of the  Policy  of
Subsidizaon  of the  Domestc  Network
Increase  in profitability  of both  the domestic  and  international  companies
*  1987-1990  Crafion of Teecommunicrons  of Jamaka  ond  the Diveutibre  of GOJs  Holdings
-Teecommunicakro  of Jamaica  (TW -a joint  venture  of GOJ  and  C&WI  to take  over  all of
JTC  and  JAMINTEL  assts and Icenrs
-New  domestic  and interneational  telecommunications  license grarted  to TOJ:
- Guawues  real  returns  on equity  In  a narrow  band  equal  to current  levels
- Restrict  govemmentl  discrtion  in approving  rate  increases
Introduce  binding  arbiration
- Alow judicial review
- Regulation  by Ministry  with  no participation  of interest  groups
B  Boom  in irnvstment
9.  Jamaica  is a two party Parliamentary  system  characterized  by strong  party  politics. The  JLPPag 6
(Jamaican  Labor  Party)  and the PNP  (People's  Natonal  Party)  have  dominated  the political  scene  since
the early  1940s,  and they have  altemated  In power  every  other  election. Their  hold  In power  has also
translated,  through  the use of patronage  and  fund raising,  into a hold on  their  legislators,  to the point
that Parliament.  today,  is more  a dellberative  than  a policy-making  body. The  two parties,  until  the late
1960s/early  1970,  were  quite similar  In their  politics,  with  the middle  and upper  classes  representing  the
swing  voters,  while  the poor  composed  both  of their  core  constituencies.  As a consequence.  until the
mid  1970s  and  again  from the mid  1980s,  borh  pardes  have  had  very similar  policies,  although  they
have  differed  in their  rethoric. Because  of the parties'  hold  on their  legislators,  governments  have
controlled,  to a large  extent,  the parliamentary  agenda. Unless  the'  issue  is constitutional,  where
parliamentary  super-malorities  are  needed,  the govemment  of the day  can  carry  its policies  through
either  administrative  or parliamentary  decisions.  Judicial  restrain  of administrative  decisions  through
statutory  (rather  than  constitutional)  Interpretation,  then,  may  not be very  effective  as the party  in
govemment  couldeasily  reverse  the Courts  interpretation  through  the introduction  of appropriate
legislation.  Jamaica's  Courts,  though,  are  highly  professional.  Supreme  Court  judges  are appointed
with  long  tenure  and  are quite  independent  of politics. The  lact that Jamaica  is part  of the British
Commonwealth  may  have helped  in further  removing  Jamaica's  Courts  from the politics  of the day as
the final Court  of Appeals  resides  in London. Furthermore,  Jamaica's  legal  tradition  is rooted  in
common  law,  with  its strong  respect  for property  rights  and the enforcement  of contracts.  The absence
of important  bicameral  divisions,  of differences  among  the executive  and  the legislature.  and the lack  of
power  of the  liackbenchers,  imply,  then,  that  while  Jamaican  Courts  may  be expected  to uphold
contracts  even  when  the govemment  is a party  to the  agreement  they may not be expected  to have
too  much  discreton  in restraining  administrative  decisions  through  statutory  interpretation. 2
2 For  a similar  intrpretaion of judiciul  powr in Great  Britan,  see Satberg (1990  and  1991).  For an anaysis  of the rods  of
po  instiukiorns  in datar.r.ing the Crt  of  ludicial  disaion  s-e Galy  end  SpUtar  (1990).Pe? 7
10.  Local  telecommunications  in Jamaica,  as in most  developing  countries,  difer from  other  public
services,  like  water  or mass  transport.  in that their  main  customers  are middle  and upper  class
households  and  businesses.'  As we will see,  though,  these  are precisely  the marginal  (or  floating)
voters. Thus,  the  availability  and pricing  of telecommunicatlons  becomes  a relatively  Important  political
issue. In other  words,  In a contested  political  environment  as the one in Jamaica,  polifical  pardes  will
be sensitive  to telephone  users'  demands.  On the  othcar  hand,  the composition  ot the demand  for
intemational  communications  is slightly  different. In particular,  loreign  trade  business  and  tourism  are
more  important  than  local  households.  As a consequence,  the pricing  of intematonal  calls  should  be
slightly  less  politically  sensitive.  Furthermore,  since  until  recently  Jamaica's  foreign  trade  regime
discriminated  against  dynarmic  export  oniented  sectors,  the pricing  of intematonal  telecommunications
was  not of major  concem  for businesses.'  Thus,  policies  attempting  to keep  domestic  telephone  prices
low and expanding  the network  so as to provide  access  to the  growing  middle  class,  would  be key
features  of both  parties'  policies.  Thus,  the Jamaican  politics  and political  structure  imply  that we
should  expect  relatve  stability  in telecommunications  policy. Changes  in government  or ideology,  then,
should  not  be expected  to be key  determinants  of telecommunications  policy.
11.  The mniddle  class  demands  for network  expansion  at low prices  require  the development  of
institutional  structures  that provide  incentives  to the  firms  to inve-t  in highly  specific  assets. Given
Jamaica's  political  structure,  though,  legislation  based  constraints  on administrative  discretion  may  not
be  credible.  Telecommunications  politics  in Jamaica,  however,  have  traditionally  been  played  in the
shadow  of the various  licenses  (and  Telephone  Acts)  goveming  the company/govemment  relationship.
Thus,  it is not surprising  that major  tuming  points  in Jamaica's  telecommunications  regulation  have
'For  example,  today  more  thanfree quanters  oft  a  JTC'5  CUStOIrfs  -e boated  In  the  Klngston  area,  and  the  penetration  Isless
then  4  telephones  per  100  residents.  As  mentioned  above,  the  main  changes  in  the  distribution  of  the  labor  force rom  the  oaly 1940s
to  the  oarly 980s  are  in  the increae  of  the  hghly pi  professional  tichnical  and  administrative  pesonnel  (from  2%  to 11%  of th
labor  force),  whie  farm  and  casual  workers  ell  from  55%  to  38%.  Blum  colar  workers'  pmrcipatlon  also  incresed  from  13%  to  M9%.
Stone  (1985).
T  'The  devlopmont  of  the data  erty sedor  during  the 198Os  creatd. however,  a highly  telcomnmunications  senoitive  sedr.
Estimates  of  demand  for  intemabionnl  service show  some  minor  increaes  in the  easticity  around  1978/1979.rage  a
followed the timing of key license renewals. The emphasis the companies and the different
governments  have traditionally given to the text of the licenses represents the recognibon  that Jamaican
governments  have had labitude  in interpreting laws.  Thus, regulation of public utilities through
legislation may provide too much discretion to the party in power.  On the other hand, a change in a
license cannot be done unilaterally by the government as requires the consent of the company.  Thus,
a violation of a clear license stipulation could be, and has been, seen by the Courts as a breach of
contract.
l.  The Parties  end Their Constituencies.
12.  Essentially,  ail academicians will agree that since 1962 (and to some extent  since 1944, the
date when Jamaica was granted universal suffrage) Jamaica has had three periods:  a period of rapid
growth. fueled by import substitution, bauxite exports, and tourism, that ended in 1972. a period of
stagnation,  socialconflict  and attempted socialization  through democratic means from 1972 till 1980,
and a period of restructuring following the old, pre-1972Z  private sector oriented policies, from 1980 till
today.
13.  These three periods also reflect the electoral politics of Jamaica.  Since 1944, Jamaica's politics
have been dominated - and affected - by the fierce competition between its two main parties. the
Jamaican Labor Party JLP, and the People's National Party PNP.  Both parties have been altemating in
power every other election, with an electoral cycle, in principle, of five years. 5 Thus, since 1944, the
JLP was in power from 1944 to 1955, from 1962 to 1972. and from 1980 to 1988.  The PNP has been
in power from 1955 tc 1962. from 1972 to 1980  and from 1988 Ill today.  Thus, power is highly
contested between these two parties, and following an electoral defeat, each has serious expectatons
of retuming to power in iess than a decade.
'  The  loalty  ofthe elecoral cycle  seems  to have been  challenged  by  the call for new elections  by the  JLP In  1983,  which  alkwed
it to continued  in power uni  1988. The PNP daired that the call for new elections  was illegal,  as it  was based on the old  vwbe
registry. and hence it boycotted  the elecdion  This gave  the JLP a total contrai  ol the lower  house until  the 19B8  eledios.Pap S
14.  Most  academicians  will also  agree that until 1972  the differences  between  the two political
parties  were mostly  of style and personalities  than  of substance. While  the JLP championed  the private
sector  as the leading  promoter  of growth,  and thus has  been  seen as a "conservative  reform  party,"  the
PNP  also supported  the private  sector,  but saw  the govemment's  role as more  important  than  the JLP.
It also aligned  itself  with  the Democratic  Socialist  tradition  of Great Britain. As a consequence,  until
1972  electoral  changes  did not bring  about  important  political  or economic  policy  changes. This policy
stability  arose  from the fact that the constituency  of both  parties  was (and  still is) essentially  the same.
Both  are poor people's  parties. The hard core  party  loyalists  are approximately  40 to 50% of the
electorate,  evenly  divided  between  the two parties  (with  a slightly  higher  number  for the PNP). This
hard core  group  is overlyrepresented  by the very  poor black  segment  of the society. The leadership  of
both  parties  camne  (and  still comes)  from the educated  Jamaican  middle  dass.
15.  Both  parties  have engaged  in substantial  politically  based  patronage  at the local  level as a
substitute  for a welfare  state. Local  level  patronage  provided  jobs and contracts  in local  projects.
access  to local  housing,  as well  as contracts  and even  overseas  jobs. Local  level  patronage  was (and
is) organized  by the local  party bosses,  safeguarded  by the local party  youth  gangs,  and effected  by the
local  Member  of Parliament Because  power  altemates  every  eight years  or so, so does  the distribution
of the spoils.s 7 As a consequence,  the very  poor segments  of the society  see the continuation  in power
of their own  party  as crucial  for the maintenance  of their  weHfare.
16.  While  the hard core  loyalists  are the very poor,  neither  party  can win just with their  hard core
loyal support. They  need  what  are called  in Jamaica  the *floating  voters." These  voters,  representing
the middle  and  upper  classes  of the society,  are more  influenced  by the economic  performance  of the
* There  i  som  evidence.  though,  that  the minority  party  is also  able to distibuto some  spois. One academic  piece claims  tha
it is up  to 40%.  but  m  other  writes suggest  a much  lower  participation  by  the minoriy.
7 Sever  authors  daim  that  the distribution  o1  patronage  goods  is  at  the  heart  of  the  pos election  vioence,  where  the  now  mqjority
g9gs takes  over  thair  respectiv districts  and  try to coerce  the minority  to give  up jobs.  housing.  etc.Pap  10
country than  by either patronage or political  rhetoric. 8 The floating  voters  are predominantly  urban  and
middle  class. These  voters  have provided  the large  swings  in votes  that the two parties  have received
(Stone  1981,  1986).
17.  For  the parties  to win, they also need  financial  support  from their  trade  unions  and upper
classes  contributors.  Thus,  until 1972  the richest  segments  of the society  could  be found  supporting
and even participating  in both  parties'  govemments. 9 The extent  of financial  support  is unknown,
though,  as it is not  reported,  but it is believed  to be widespread. It is clear,  nevertheless,  that financial
support  has  not provided  the richest  segments  of the society  with control  over those  parties'  policies.
The governments.  not just  until 1972  but until today,  have  undertook  economic  policies  that have  been
strongly  opposed  by their  own supporters  arnong  the richest  segments. What  financial  and political
support  seems  to have  provided  the upper  segments  of the society  is access  and also an equivalent
sort of patronageas  the poor  segments  get  with their  votes. Several  scholars 0 claim  ftat Government
contracts,  import  rights  and licenses  have  been  handed  out in an unrepresentative  (and  uncompetitve)
way  to the rich supporters  of the respective  parties.  as a form of  rich people's  patronage. To a large
extent until the mid  to late  80s, import  controls  and licenses  have provided  this segment  with a steady
source  of prolitable  opportunities  in both  import  substhituion  and distribution  activities." The
opportunities  that the import  substition  process  of the 60s  and 70s provided  to the members  of the
richer  segments  of society  implied  that senior  government  jobs moved  during  the period  from  the upper
class  to the middle,  educated,  and upwardly  mobile  black  groups. These  individuals  made,  until  the
4 To somne  Cent, the intelligentsla  seems to have shaed  with  the very  poor  segments  a strong  interest  in political  rhtoric.
*  For example,  during the PNP  government  of the early 1970s, Eli Matlon  wasa  member  of cabet  while b  the s4me time,
Mayr Motin  was the Chainman of the Jamaican  Bauxie Comnission  that negotiated with the Bauxite compauies  the royalLy  to be
See. e.g.. Edie (1991).
"hlsexplainstheiriniti  opposition  to the Seaga  liberaliaion  program  of thn 1980s.  which has  continued  duriLg  the subsequen
Mnley  adntisbton.Pag  II
mid 1970s,  the core  of a stable,  conservative,  senior  bureaucracy,  characterized  by strong  seniority
system  and protessionalism.
18.  Thus,  until the 1970s.  there  was a political  consensus  that can be described  as follows: both
parties  catered  to the poor segments  through  their own  different  rhetoric  and  through  patronage.  They
catered  to the richer segments  through  maintaining  import  substituon policies,  as well as through  te
contnuous  expansion  of govemment.' 2 The middle  class  also benefitted  from the growth  of
govemment.  through  their encroachment  in the bureaucracy  and in the small business  - also
govemment  related/dependent  - sector.' 3 The growth  in the professional  bureaucracy  and in the small
business  sector  was accompanied  by the growth  of professionals  in general. While in 1943  only 2% of
the employed  labor force  were professional  and technical  employees  (11,000  in total), by 1980
professionals  reached  11%  of the employed  labor  force  (or 81,000),'4  making  the small business  and
professional  middle  class  a stronger  and more  vocal  political  force.' 5
19.  Not only  there  was a political  consensus.  but party  politics  were also quite similar  in both
parties. The control  of the national  party  resided  with the national  leadership.  MPs seem  to have  very
litte representativeness.  as their contact  with their local  consttuencies  was mostly  through  the local
bosses  (and  armed party  activists). Furtherrnore,  the fact that there are very  few districts  where  local
voting  outcomes  substantially  differ  fron. national  outcomes,  implies  that voters  did not see  their
12  Govemment  employment  grew  from  4.500  in 1943.  to  57.0W0  In 1968  and  to 110,000  in 19a80  Sinilarly,  pubic expendtures
shae of GDP was 13% n 150,.17%  In  1962,21%  n 1967 and 42%6hI  1977.  Simuly.  fiscal defit  sas shareof GDP w  los
than 3% unti  1970.  It increased throLgh the deaide reaching  20.8% in 1980. faing  back to 13.7% by 1S84.
3 By 1980thesmall busins  s-ea  had grown  significantly  both  in terms ofthe numberof enlerprises and empoymnienL  By 1980
there were 50000 smll  buinesses  (with less than 50 empbyees), occupying  31% of the  labor  foch  In contast  ther  wvo  only
a thousand lr  entrer_is  (emplying  more  than 50 empbyees), empbying 23% of the labor tre.  The pay  commodit  ser.
though. employed  the largeht  number (46% of the labor force), and having  the largest number  of enterprises r3O0O).  The g owth
of tie  small business  sacor  is A result of the change  in the strutre  of Jamaica7s  economy. WhUe  in 1938 agriculture contibted
36% of GDP. by 1  93  Ns share war only of 7%. On the  ther hand manufacturing  increased  *om 6 to  19%,  while govenmem and
other services (apart  om trnde and commune)  ncesd  frm  18 to 41  %  Stone (1986).
"rhe number  of gainfully employed increased  during the 1943-1980  period from 505,000  to 737,000.
"  See Stoe  ( 9868).Page 12
representatives  as particularly important for their weffare.  Local party bosses performed the distribution
of the spoils.  As a consequence,  the governing party will usually have a strong majority in Parliament,
with no MP being able to extract particular rents from the leadership itself.  Parliament, then, serves
today mostly as a forum for discussion rather than as a place were policy decisions are made.  These
are made as the result of the interplay of the Prime Minister, the ditferent ministries and their respective
bureaucracies. Parliament has played (and still plays) a definitely minor role in Jamaican politics."
20.  As Table 1 shows, two major changes in the regulatory structure ot the sector occurred during
the decade 1965-1975. This is a decade of large social and political changes in Jamaica. During the
mid to late 1960s as the growth rate started to fail, urban unemployment to grow.'7 and social unrest
developed,  the consensus between the two main parties started to crumble, as a gradual change
started to develop in both the goveming JLP and the PNP in their populist policies.  The JLP
govemment.  therrunder the influence of the  1-mance  Minister, Edward Seaga, pursued a process of
Jamnaicanization  of some of the mnajor  sectors of the economy, e.g. the financial sector, but also the
telecommunications  sector.  Jamaicanization,  though, did not mean nationalization.  Instead, it
consisted of pushing towards partial ownership of the companies  by Jamaican nationals.  Seaga
pushed for this process to be undertaken through the stock market.  Thus, foreign holding companies
were supposed to sell part of their stock in the domestic company in the local stock market with the
purpose of achieving 51% of domestic ownership."
'  This  however.  was not the cs  during the colonial peiod,  evon in the  inerim  perod  between 1ul adult suffage  and
independence. During  that time. poltics were more  locaL  as the central goernmernt was not much involved in income  rediribtAon
in a major scale. Thus, locsl independent  candidates  were abl  to achieve  substial  sLupport This support. diminished,  though,
as  independence  approached.  Thus,  while independent  candidates  obtained  35% of the vote (and  five out of  the 32 3ose)  in the 1944
elections.  they only  gained 11% of tho popular  vote (and no sass)  in the 1965  5ection.  The dedined continue.  and since the 1959
eections. independen candidates  have not gained more  than 1% of the total vote.
'  From 1950ito 1960  GNP grew  byan average  of B.1%  peryear. From 1961  to 1972 at anaveroge of 5.8%peryearw. rom  1973
to 1980 at -2.3% per year, and from 1981 to 1986 it grew atthe rate of 1.1  5% per yew.
"  As we discuss  below.  the application  of  this Jamaicanrzation  process  to the international  telecommunications  company  involed
the outnght aeation a a joint venture  with C&W.  whie  for  JTC n required lhe  expasrion  of the capital base of  JTC through male in
the Jamairan stodc market  so as to reduce  the foreign  company's  ownership  share  to no more  than 20%  This howevr,  was never
achieved.Page 13
21.  The consensus  was finally broken following the 1972 ascension of PNP.  While the PNP saw
itself, as mentioned,  as a Democratic  Socialist party, in 1974 PM Michael Manley declared its
govemrnment  to be a socialist one, aligned with Cuba and the Third World, and started to pursue
aggressively  a socialist path to Jamaica.  This policy was opposed vigorously by the JLP and the upper
middle and rich classes.  The main ingredients of the domestic part of this new policy was land reform,
nationalization  of large industries,  job creation and new welfare programs. The legal system's defense
of property rights, and the independence  of the judiciary,' 9 though, turned extremely expensive the land
reform and nationalization  policies, as they had to be done through outright purchase rather than direct
expropriation. The PNP, tried to pass a change in the constitution that would have eliminated property
right protection  in selected sectors, but it was abandoned  facing substantal oppositon from the JLP, as
well as disinterest  from the public at large.
22,  The Mantey govemment lsted  until 1980 when the JLP, this time under PM Edward  Seaga,
regained power. As mentoned above, the new govemment  started a liberaflization  process,  strongly
supported and encouraged  by both the IMF and the World Bank, that involved privatizabon  of
previously  nationalized  companies  as well as foreign trade liberalizabon. During  the 1980s  the
opposition,  sensing popular disenchantment  with its previous policies, came back to its traditional pre-
72 mode, to the point that when it regained power in 198B,  it followed. and to some extent deepened,
the policies initiated by the JLP, including the total privatizabon  of the  telecommunications  sector.
It.  The Judidway and Administrative  Discretion.
23.  We claimed above that Jamaica's political  structure provides substantial discretion to the party
in power. We claimed, furthermore,  that Jamaican govemments are potentally constrained by the
''  Several  factors  contribule  to the independence  of the  judiciary. First, while  the judges we appointed  by the govemment  of the
day, the judges of the Supreme  CoLrt  have long lasting tenure  satus.  As a consequence,  they wre not eosily  removed. Second,
appUl3  to Supreme  Court decisions  go directly  to the Privy Council  In London.  further isolating  final judiciary docisions  from local
poltc.Page 14
Courts  upholding  of property  rights  and of contracts. In this section  we provide  evidence  on the role of
the judiciary  in constraining  administrative  decisions.
24.  As brietly  mentioned  abovet,  the judiciary  played  a minor role in the 30 years of independence,
except  during  the 1970s  where  its adherence  to property  rights  partially  contributed  to restrain  the PNP
government  from outright  expropriaffng  land and industrial  enterpnes. The judiciary,  though,  did not
completely  restrain  the govemment  in its regulaton  of inu private  utilities. For example,  while  the
license  granted  to the Jamaica  Omnibus  Service  spectfied  that  the decisions  of the Public  Passenger
Transport  Board  of Control  could  be appealed  to the Court  o1  Appeal  (the  Jamaican  Supreme  Court),
during  its contentious  relation  to the Board  the JOS  never  actually  appealed.  Also, the regulation  by
the recently  created  JPUC  of the electricity  company,  Jamaican  Pubic  Service Ltd (JPS),?'  seems  to
have been so contentious  that during  1970,  followung  a very  long rate  hearing,  the stock price of the
company  was atan all time low, at one tenth of (revalued)  book value. The JLP  govemment  took the
opportunity  and nationalized  the utility  through  direct  stock-market  purchases.
25.  The  fact that JPS did not obtain  relief  from  the judiciary  reflects  the basic  limitations  of the
judiciary  in restraining  administrative  decisions  by the govemment  in a parliamentary  system. Since  the
govemment  has  majority  in Parliament.  any judicial  interpretation  of the act which  differs  from the
govemments  can  be reversed  by Parliament  by a re-interpretaton  of its previous  legislation.  This was
aggravated  by the way Jamaica's  regulatory  commissions  and boards  were organized. The members
were political  appointees,  who rotated  with the party  in power  (see  Mills (1981)). Thus,  for example,
upon  the PNP  coming  to power  in 1972,  the members  of the JPUC  were replaced  by PNP  affiliated
commissioners.  Thus,  regulatory  agencies  in Jamaica  are  not immune  from local politics  and in
- According  to Swaby  (1981).  JOS  repeatedly  thratened  the Boawd  with  a judicia  review.  but  was  never  carried  ouL Swaby
raiows  conems about  the  grounds  under  which  the Court  af  Appoas  could  overtum  a Bawd's  decsion.  Sinco  the Bard funcioned
as  a sanjudicla  enfty.  audicating rs  incraes basd an  the  presented  facs collectd by  both  the  company  and  the Bowd's  stba.
the ground3  for ovetinmg a Board's  decicion  must  be based  an 'manest imprpriety in dodeing  with  the issues.
2'  The  JPUC  w  ascerod by  an Act of  Pariaunont  in 1966 Until  thenm  JPS  wa  regulated  by  the Mmistiy.Pap  15
particular  from  the political  tendencies  of the party  in power.'  The populism  of both  the JLP and  the
PNP,  then,  translated  into very  activist  regulatory  agencies,  which  the judiciary  could  not be expected  to
effectively  restrain.
26.  The  Courts,  however,  seemed  to have  been  able  to restrain  outright impropriety  in dealing
with  the issues. For example,  JTC's  1945  license  shpulated  that the company's  rates  should  provide  a
return  of 8%  over  rate  capital. Deficit  earnings  below  those  levels  could be accumulated,  and  should
be counted  towards  eamings  in the next rate  review  in front of a Rate  Board. The license  also
stpulated  that both  the company  and rate payers  had the right  to appeal  the Rate  Board's  decisions  to
the Supreme  Court. In 1956  the Rate  Board  disaUowed  JTC's  claim  to increase  rates  to compensate
for past  deficiencies.  JTC.  represented  by a former  attomey-general  of Great  Britain,  appealed  to the
Supreme  Court and in December  1956  the Court  determined  that JTC was  entitled  to recover  those
amounts.  This  was  the last time  that the Jamaican  Supreme  Court  actually  restrained  the
administation  in its relation  with  the Jamaican  public  utilities. For example,  following  a JPUC  decision
in 1974  to grant  only 2/3 of the requested  price  increase  by JTC,  the Jamaica  Tax and Ratepayers
Association,  a consumer  group  that participated  in the proceedings  filed an appeal  with  the Court  of
Appeal  to have  the rate  increase  reversed. In that instance,  the JTC appealed  to the Court  as well.=
The appeals  were  not granted.
27.  The judiciary  could  also be expected  to constrain  the govemment  on constilutional  decisions,  or
on  specific  contracts  the govemment  entered  with private  parties. In the case  of the regulated  utilities,
the regulatory  framework  was  based  on the enabling  law (i.e.,  the telephone  act,  the telegraph  law,  the
electricity  act.  etc).  the license  provided  to the  lirm, and  following  1966.  the PUC  Act  Only  the license
The  length of service  of commissioners  (JPUCs length  was three  years).  however,  cannot  be seen as  xogenous.  Ir
the 1966 PUC Ad purxosly made  the  JPUC commissioners  pditcaily  accutablae.
2  As we will  discuss  below, it is under  whether  JTC appealed  to block  the consumer  group's  appeal, or wheher it appealed
so es  to  obtain  a larger  price  incease.Page  16
could have been seen as a contract between the government and the firm on which the company could
appeal to the judiciary tor a breach of contract by the govemment  In the case of the electricity
company, neither the act nor the license specified a particular minimum rate of retum.  Instead it
stipulated that the company was supposed to charge rates so as to obtain a reasonable return. 24 In the
case of the telephone law, the act stpulated that the licensee should be allowed to obtain a net return
of 8% on its rate base.  Thus, in principle, the telephone companies (both the intemational and the
local) could appeal to the judiciary for administrative decisions which did not aliow the company to
recover its stipulated rate of retum.  The fact that, as we will see, under the JPUC, the J  T C seldom
achieved such a rate of retum, and that JTC only appealed  to the Courts following an amendment to its
license that stipulated a minimum rate of retum, suggests that the Courts effectiveness in restraining
legislation- based administrative decisions may be quite different from their effectiveness in upholding
license stipulabons.  further suggesting  the incompleteness  of legislation as a contract
Ill.  A Contracting  Analysis  of Key Periods and Events In Jamaica's Telecommunications
Sector. 1  880-1985.
28.  The purpose of this section is twofold: first  it serves as an 'empirical  tesr  of our main
hypotheses. Thus. in this section we explore, for selected periods and events, to what extent
contracting costs between the firm(s) and the govemrnment,  and between interest groups and the
govemment affected the performance of the sector, and to what extent attempts to resolve those
contracting problems  may have affected regulatory policies.  A second purpose of this section is to
provide the background information necessary to be able to analyze the regulatory and structural
changes of 1987.
29.  There are six major distinct periods in the evolution of Jamaica's telecommunications. The
major events of these periods are presented in italics in T  able 1.  In this section we explore the first five
2"  Only rte  incases  required  govermenta  approvaLPage 17
of these events  and periods  in the light of the discussion  in Sections  II and Ill.  Unbl  the mid 1980s,
Jamaica's  regulatory  tramework  and policy  evolved  differently  for the domestic  and international
segments.  Thus.  we analyze  the main events  and regulatory  changes  for each of the two segments
separately.
I.  Domestic Telecommunications.
a.  Telecommunications  Policy under  Colonial Rule: 1880-1961.
30.  Telecommunications's  regulatory  policy  under  colonial  rule was based  on the specific  provisions
of the different  licenses  under  which  the various  firmrs  operated. The regulatory  reforms  introduced  in
the mid-1960s  dra3tically  changed  the regulatory  environment  and the performance  of the sector.
Thus. to understand  the implications  of the regulatory  changes  of the mid-1960s  an analysis  of the
colonial  nstatus-quo 8 is required.
31.  Several  companies  operated  telephone  systems  in Jamaica  until  the mid 1940s. The  Jamaica
Telephone  Company  (JTC)  was incorporated  in .1892  and took over the small  operations  of the West
Indies  Telegraph  and Telephone  Company.  JTC  was granted  a non-exclusive  license  to operate
throughout  the island;  initial  shareholders  of JTC included  well-known  Jamaican  business  families.
Other companies  also received  during  the 1890s  non-exclusive  rights  to operate  small scale  telephone
systems. Eventually,  JTC obtained  in 1925  a 40  years  exclusive  license  to provide  telephone  services
in Kingston  and St. Andrew. The  Jamaican  Post  Office  operated  the All Island  Telephone  System  in
the remaining  parts  of the island. JTC's 1925  license  provided  the govemment  with specific  takeover
conditions.  In particular,  the Govemment  had the right  to take over  the company  at license  renewal  time
at a price  to be agreed  upon  by the company. If there  was disagreement,  the takeover  price  should
reflect  the revalued  assets  of tie  company. The 1925  license  included  two other  important  provisions:
first, the company  (or any  twelve ratepayers)  could  file for rate reviews  to be undertaken  by a three
member  ad-hoc  Rate  Board,  named  by the Govemor  of Jamaica. Rate  Board  decisions  could  bePage  18
appealed  to the Supreme  Court. Second.  JTC was  allowed  to obtain  an 8% return  on its rate base.
Current  year earning  deficiencies  (or excesses)  would  be entered  into a  Excess  and Deficiency
Account'  to be kept  for future  rate  variations. As long  as the rate of return  was not below  7%  the
company  was not entitled to insist  upon  an increase  to make  up for the deficiency.  The Board  was not
entited to insist  on a reduction  unless  rates of return  exceeded  9%.
32.  In 1945,  one  year after  the introduction  of universal  suffrage,  JTC acquired  the All Island
Telephone  System  from the Post  Office  and received  an exclusive  license  to operate  telephone
services  in the whole  island. The 1945  license  was granted  for the remaining  part  of the 40 year
Kingston  and St. Andrew  license.  and reflected  the general  terms  discussed  above. As in the 1925
license,  Rate  Boards  were  created  for each  rate review. They had no irstituonal memory,  nor
permanent  staff. The Rate  Boards  employed  ad-hoc  consultants,  paid by the company  but selected  by
the Rate  Board,  to review  JTC accounts  following  an application  for a rate increase.25  The Rate  Boards
were  supposed  to deal  expeditiously  with rate increases,  and at least  during  the 1950s  there  were rate
increases  in 1950,  1952,  1956,  1957,  1958  and 1960. Rate  Boards,  suffered.  then,  from a structural
informational  asymmetry  vis-&-vis  the company,  which,  to some  extent,  may have served  the company.
In between  rate  reviews  the company  was essentially  left alone,  and the company's  development  plan
was  of its own design.0
33.  The 1950s  saw  sustained  growth  in the number  of subscriber  . For example,  the number  of
telephones2r  increased  from 13,437  in 1950  to 41,152  in 1962. Accounting  rates  of return  on rate  base
2An  interesting  alteraion  devped  owing a 1950 rate  vew  in whichthe company  relused  to pay  tho bil of the cowt
beause  it disagreed  with the  =  fts  actual  work  Mr R.  Swaby, an accountant. tried  to  spara.  against the conpanys
co.plinrts.  tatot cost- into Kingston. All Island  and Toll charges, Eventually  the GOJ had to pay one third of Mr Swaby's biL
2X  .1hea  -as  a modicum  ot qualdy  rguation  through an inspecor appoited  by  the Govemor. The tesk of the inspector  was to
supennse  the cnditions  of the plard.
I  Number of tlephones  are nain lines plus extensins  As Figure 1 shows there has been a relaiely  stable ratio ot two
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during  the last part of the 1  950s  were in the range  of 5-7%. While  strong  disagreements  between  JTC
and  the different  Rate Boards  of the 1950s  were not unheard  off, license,  low real interest  rates  and
inflation,  and free capital  flows  made  the 1925  and 1945  domestic  licenses  relaSively  appropriate
instruments  to support  private  development.2a
34.  To summarize,  colonial  regulatory  institutions  were based  on contract  law rather  than on public
utility  legislation. Furthermore,  the strict  specifications  of the license,  provided  incentives  for the
domestic  company  to invest  and develop. The end of the colonial  era. though,  was also the end of
JTCrs  licenses,  which were due to expire  in 1965,  and their renegotiabon  during  the early 1960s  is
crucial  to understand  the development  of the sector  during  the 1970s.
b.  The  Issuing of New Ucenses to JTC and the Creation of the JPUC4(1962-1966).
35.  The regulatory  stability  of the colonial  period  ended  with independence  and the granting  of new
licenses  to the domestic  and intemational  operabng  companies.  The granting  of the new licenses  serve
as a particularly  interesting  event  as it exemplifies  the hazards  of using  licenses  as safeguards.  As
long as licenses  have finite  term-.  end games'  will develop,  in which both  the firm(s) and the
govemment  will take actions  so as to improve  their bargaining  positions  in the license  renewal  (or
granting)  process,  as well as to safeguard  their  assets. If renewal  is uncertain,  and the vajuation  of the
assets  is not sufficiently  advantageous,  the firm may hesitate  to invest  in any more  specific  assets.
Similarly,  the government  may attempt  to extract  a commitment  to a better  investment  program  through
delaying  the renewal. Uncertainty  about the resolution  of the licensing  renewal  process  has,  then,
predictable  performance  implications.
'  Obsev  thal  the 8%  real  raf t  return  could  have  been  completely  inadequate  in the 1  970s  when  interos were  in  the two
digits  level  Thus.  the adequacy  of the 1925  lcense is subject  to the panicular  stable  economic  onvironment  for which  it W
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36.  Independence.  the growth  of the two national  political  parties,  and the disappearance  of the
independent  politician  (all  forces  centralizing  power  in the Prime  Minister)  changed  the political  calculus
at the time  when  the terms  of the main telecommunications  licenses  were to expire. Cable  & Wireless
was granted  a license  relatively  easily  in 1961  just before  the declaration  of independence.  JTC,
however,  did not fare as well. Since  independence  in 1962,  JTC (under  the control  of the Telephone
and General  Trust  Co, -T&GT,  a British  concern)  refused  the government  request  to expand  Its services
unless  a new exclusive  all-island  license  was  granted  with a specific  pricing  policy  in place. The  effects
of the company's  refusal  to invest  and expand  can  be seen in Figure 1. Figure  1 shows  that the
number  of main  lines  remained  stagnant  from 1962  to 1967,  while  the number  of telephones  increased
steadily. Stagnation  was also visible  at the debt  level  of the company. Its long term  debt remained
relatively  constant  in J$ from 1960  to 1966  (around  J$3M). T&GT  loans  to the company  fell  from
J$1.2M  in 1963  to $.8M  in 1966. Finally,  while  in 1969  there  were 66,500  telephones  in service,
customer  demand  was estimated  to be 184.000.2'
37.  The  company's  refusal  to invest  and expand  after 1961  reflects  the uncertainties  surrounding
the renewal  of the license  1ollowing  the declaration  of independence.  In 1962,  following  the first
elections  under  independence,  the company  made  a request  for a substantial  rate increase  to
compensate  for previous  revenue  deficiencies  (as  allowed  by the 1945  license  and the Supreme  Court
decision  of 1956). The govemment  however.  requested  the rate review  to be postponed  and decided
to start negotiations  about  license  renewal.30  Renewal  negotiations  started  in October  1963,  and a
Rate  Board  was established  on June 1963. The  Rate  Board,  however,  did not allow  any important  rate
increase  durng its existence,  and the next rate  increase  came  only in 1971  following  the creation  of the
'  World  Bank ReporL 'Curront Economic  Position and Prospects  ot Jamaica.' February 1974. p.5Z  This figurs. though, is
substantially  abev,  the number  of requests  for main  fines. See Figure  21.
3  Since  thb company  had the tight to request  a rat  hearing,  the company agreed to postpone  only if the Goverment in turm
agroed to severF conditions a) to appoint  a Rate Board; b) to allow  wage increases to be recovered; and c) to  recognize  the
company's  right lo recover  ening  delfiencien as specified  under the 1945 license.Page 21
JPUC  in 1966,  and following  the transfer  of T&Grs shares  to the Continental  Telephone  Company  -
CTC.
38.  The  negotiations  over  the renewal  of JTC's  license  lasted  three  years.  during  which  limo the
relations  between  the principa.  shareholder  (T&GT)  and the GOJ became  very  contentious.  A now
license  was granted  in 1965  but was amended  in 1966  to accommodate  tho formal  creaton of the
Jamaican  Public  Utilities  Commission  (JPUC). A government  paper  of May 1966  sets out the terms  for
the renewal. The 1966  license  included  several  new features: a) a PUC  style regulatory  system;  b) a
term of 25 years  (starting  January  1, 1967),  renewable  for another  10; and most Importantly,  that c) the
Jamaican  public  should  hold a large  proporticn  of tlae  company's  shares,  with no individual  (including
the current  owner)  could hold  more  than 20% of the company  (T&GT  owned  50.2%  of the stock).
T&GT  was given  six years  to dispose  of the 30.2%  excess  holding. Differing  from tho 1945  license,  the
1966  license  dithot  provide  for a minimum  rate of retum on the rate base,  but rather  provided  for a fair
retum. 3'  The rate base  to be determined  by the JPUCI.32
39.  By the end of the negotiation  period,  T&GT  was looking  to divest  its interest  in JTC,  even
though  it was granted  a new license. The long negotiations  for the renewal  of the license,  coupled  with
the de-facto  freez- on pricesn  following  independence  and 'he uncertainty  over  the outcome  of the
renewal  negotiatons,  reduced  JTC's  incentives  to invest  and  to maintain  the outside  plant. Thus, by
I  The  Public  Utlities  Commission  Act though,  determined  that  the  JPUC  should  set  rates  that  will  provide  the utilites  not  mre
than  2.5%  above  the redemption  yield  of Govemmernt  long  term  bonds  issued  in the  UK Thus,  the  PUC  Act  did  not  require  a  rirnimum
rats  at retum  either. The  Telephone  AcL  though,  provided  for an 6% return  on the rats base. The  JPUC  Interpreted  this provision
to mean  'permited' rather  than entitled.' See  the discussion  in the  next  section.
m  This  is  not  a  trivial  provision  during  periods  of  high  investments.  In  those  crases  whether  works  in progress  are  countod  towards
the  rate  base  or not  has  non-trivial  revenue  implicataons.  as  it affects  the rate  base  and  the total  amount  of depreciation.  Right  after
CTC's  takeover  of JTC.  this issue  arose.  with (predictably)  JTC  claiming  that investments  on  works  in progress  should  be counted
in the year  they re undeftaken.  while  the JPUC  requiring  those  irvestrment  to be included  in the rate  base  only  upon  complton.
u  Adding  to the uncetainty  felt by  JTC about public  policy  towards  telecommunications  is the refusal  by the newly  eleded
government  In 1962  to include  the company  in the list  of basic  industries  so as to quality  for investment  allowances  under  the Tax
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1967  the system  that experienced  continued  growth  during  the 19SOs  was  in need  of major
investments,  both  because  of unsatisfied  demand  as well as because  of badly  maintained  equipment.
40.  The  renegotiation  of JTC's  license  provides  a basic  insight  on the role  of licenses  as
safeguarding  institutons: their  finite  term  implies  that the company  will face  substantial  uncertainty
about  its investments  unless  either  the license  clearly  specifies  how  the company's  assets  would  be
valued  at expiraton  time.' or the company  is able manipulate  the political  process  appropriately.  Since
expiration  time is the main  time for govemment  to change  the nature  of the license,  the company  faces
substantally  more  uncertainty  at expiration  than  at renewal  ime.  JTCs 1945  license  stipulated  that if
the government  does not  want  to issue  a new .Icemrne  -o t.io :;censee,  then  it has  to announce  it year
ahead  that the licensee  has  to sell to the Government  its assets  at a fair market  value  plus 10%. The
1945  license,  though,  was  silent  for the case  when  the Govemment  does  not  force  a sale but  the
company  does  nOt  agree  to the new license. The  failure  to specify  the :iquidabon  terms  for that
contingency  implies  that the Courts  may  have  to be called  to arbitrate  these  terms. Meanwhile,  the
company  would  be operating  without  a license,  in a precarious  legal  environment  and - with
overwhelming  foreign  ownership  - limited  political  supporL T&GT  seemed  to have  realized  this
eventuality  by a) stopping  its investment  plans  early  in the negotiation  process,  b) agreeing  to the new
license  even  though  it did not intend  to operate  under  it, and c) looking  for another  company  interested
in operating  the domestic  network  under  the new  conditions.
41.  The  new license,  which  was issued  in 1966.  made  the JPUC  the regulator  of JTC. The JPUC
was  granted  wide powers  and responsibilities,  both  in terns of service  supervision,  planning  and  rate
setting.  The JPUC  was created  as a statutory  corporaton,  its decisions  subject  to review  only  by te
3'  We have lo differentiste  between renewal  and expirntion. In a renewr4  the govewment may decide not to renew,  and the
lime  vil  usually detil  ways to  dispose of the company's assm  (ther  through a  sale to anothr  company, or through a
gwomrmental  takeover). Expiration  requires  a new  license  to be writtn,  and  the govemment  may grant  the now ficnse  to another
company. The  old icerewe  thogh,  wil usualy stipLiot  ways by which  the assets  have  to be disposed  at. Ucenses usualy  _owed
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Jamaican  Supreme  Court. It was  to hold  public  hearings  in relation  to rate  increases.  to publicize  its
intended  decisions  and  to subject  its decisions  to particular  formal  delays. The  PUC  Act also  attempted
to bridge  the  gap between  sector  legislaton  and licenses,  by requiring  the PUC  to take industry
legislabon  intc account  as 6i  relates  to minimum  rates  of return?, 5 The  nature  of JPUC's  powers,
responsibilities  and  procedures  made  bargaining  between  the company  and the govemment  more
difficult Any  deal  between  the company  and the govemment  had to get, in principle,  the  approval  of
the  JPUC,  who  in tum,  would  be subject  to pressure  from interest  groups  participating  in its
determination.  While  the  comrmissioners  were  appointed  only  for three  years,  short  tern discrepancies
between  the JPUC  and  the govemment  could  easily  develop,  increasing  bargaining  costs.
ca  The Takeover of JTC by Continental Telephone Company.
42.  The license  renewal  process  that  culminated  with the regulatory  change  of 1966  changed
T&GT  calculus.  -ft not only  decided  to stop its development  plan,  but also  to leave  the island. In this
uncertain  environment  the  Continental  Telephone  Co. (CTC  - a Canadian  based  holding  company,
which  had  been  established  in 1961,  and  was  undertaking  an extremely  raoid  acquisition  program  in
the  U.S.,  Canada  and the  Caribbean)  expressed.  in mid 1967,  interest  in taking  over  T&Grs holdings
in  JTC.  The  conditions  under  which  CTC  agreed  to take  over  T&GT  are  important  as they,  in tum.
influenced  the  development  of the GOJIJTC  relationship.
43.  As a condition  to the transfer  of shares  and of the license.  Contnental  agreed  to undertake
several  financial  and developmental  obligations.  Some  of the most  important  ones  were:  a) to
refinance  a 1966  15  year  World  Bank  loan  for US$11.5M  into  a 25 year  loan  at rates  not to exceed  .5
above  the NY  prime  rate;  b) to lend  to JTC USS  5M  under  similar  conditions  (the  loan  was  to be
redeemed  through  selling  JTC  shares  to the public  - except  to CTC);  c) to reduce  its ownership  share
Thus,  the JPUC  should  have  considered  tha 8% minimum  rate of return  on rate stipulated  by  the Telephone  Act, een though
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to 20% by January 1971: d) to expedite the completion  of JTC's development plan (of JS13M)  to within
three to three and one halt years. The development  plan had very specific quantitative  goals in terms
oi new service and expansion.
44.  Continental  involvement  in JTC was greeted  by the GOJ with enthusiasm. First and  foremost,
having a large telephone  holding company becoming  the parent of JTC seemed to the GOJ to relieve
JTC of its liquidity  constraint  and lack of access to capital.  Second,  CTC's commitment  to the
investment  program  and to a particular  increase in service generated substantial  expectations  of
improvements  in service after several years of stagnant  service and increasing demand. Continental,
however.  seems to have overvalued  the quality of JTCs equipment  This can be seen from the price it
paid for T&GTs shares, as well as from the evolution  of its investment  plan."a",
4S.  As we will see below, CTC's investments  did not pay off very well.  Furthermore,  the conditions
under which CTC took over JTC were such that it should not have been expected  to be proftable.
Thus, CTC's involvement  under the conditions  of the 1966  license is puzzling. One feasible
explanation  is that it simply reflects CTC's "growing  pains." Since CTC was under a very rapid
acquisition  plan, this may have simply be another  case of mismanagement  in acquisitions. On the
other hand. it may reflect the differences between  the operations  of PUC systems  in the US and in
Jamaica. Since the JPUC was crafted to resemble  US style regulatory proceedings,  CTC may have
expectad  to be treated in Jamaica in the same way that its US telephone utilities were treated by the
US stare regulators.  without recognizing  the basic institutional  differences  between the two countries
X  Continental  paid  T&GT in 1967  JS1.1  9 per share, implying  that JTC's equity was valued at JS.11.6  Million. Our computation
of JTC's real assets  imply  that its 1969  equity was  JS8.8 Miflion  (at 1969 prices),  a price premium  of at beast  30%. Thus, CTC  must
have  either  sswumed  thatthe operation  of the domestic  network  was going  to be very proftable.  or it valued  JTC's assets  attest  S3M
owr the real value. Since  the debts  are usually mtore  transparent  than the "alum  of  atsets. CTC may have avevalued JTCsa  fixed
assets by at loast JS3  M in 1969 prices. Since  we value JTC-s  fixed assets in 1969  at JS20M  (1969 prices).  CTC  overvuluation  of
ficed assets  must have  been at least 15%.
I  I  mmediately  aftet  taking over  JTC,  the company  revised  upwards  its expansion  plan to JS25M.  In 1969  1 was ufithr increased
to J$42.2M. because.  it was claimed.  the poor quality of the outside  plant  Also. the maintenance  costs of the company  in the early
1  970s became  a coteontious  issue  with the JPUC.Page  25
(e.g., Jamaica's lack of legislative checks and balance,  the diminished role of the judiciary in restraining
administrative  discretion). Finally, CTC might have expected to be able to renegotiate,  the terms of its
participation  once it was in.  If this is the case,  though, then CTC clearly did not understand the
workings of the regulatory and political structure in which it was supposed to participate. In any case,
CTC's  entrance into Jamaica's telephone sector remains a not so easily explainable puzzle.
d.  The JPUC and the Ouasf-Exproprlatlon of JTC's Assets:1968-1975.
46.  The period that follows the regulatory change of 1966 is crucial for our understanding of the
role of particular insttutions in providing commitment power.  What we will see is that given Jamaican
politics after independence,  a regulatory  framework characterized by a) substantal administrative
discreton, b) decentralized regulatory processes with interest groups participation, and c) concentrated
(foreign) ownership,  did not provide sufficient constraints  to avoid the quasi-expropriab'on  of the
company's specific assets.
47-  In 1968  JTC started a development  program (see Figure 1 for number of lines and Figure 5 for
investments). At the same tme JTC started to demand rate increases'  which received substantial
oppositon from the JPUC.  JTC also started to change its forecast of inves1ment  and revenue needs.
The JPUC also questioned the actual extent of investments  that JTC was undertaking.  Figure 1 shows
that there was an increase in main lines in 1969 but that until 1974 main lines increased only slowly,
while at the same time, number of telephones increased continuously,  even during the stagnation
period of the early 1  96Ds. Figure 7, on the other hand, shows that the lack of growth in main lines was
accompanied by an increase in fixed assets until 197D. Fuxed  assets remained constant until 197Z and
started to grow slowly until the nationalization  of JTC 1975.  The JPUC claimed that JTC was reneging
Tlhe  last impoant  rate increase before  CTCs takemoer  waz in 1955. In 1960 there was a minor  aQustaent  The first roe
increa  requested by JTC was mi  1968 lor two paSiculur  exchanges. The JPUC  rejected the appication outright  indicating ht  it
warted to undeake  a major revision of the whole  tariff strudure, rather  approve  increases on an exchange by exchange basiLPag  26
on its development  plan,  and as a consequence  no rate increases  would  be granted.? In the  wake of
these  disagreements  with JPUC,  JTC halted  its investment  program  in July 1971.  at the same  time  that
it formnally  applied  for a rate  increase  of 17%. The JPUC  granted  a rate  increase  of 15%  effective
December  1971. Soon  after that,  in April 1972,  JTC  applied  for a new rate increase  of 54%. In August
1972  the commission  granted  an average  price  increase  of 35%  as of September  1972. During  these
difficultes  with  the JPUC  the price  of JTC's  shares  fell to 28 Jcents  by March  1972.  well below  our
book  value  estmate  of J$1.3  for December  1971,  and  of the J$1.13  paid by CTC.
48.  In its August  1972  report,  the JPUC  stated  a policy  of making  prices  contingent  on the quality
of the service. It furthermore  stated  that the license  reference  to the Telephone's  Act stpulation  of a
permnittedo  rate  of retum  is 'not an absolute  entitlement. This decision  by the JPUC  seems  to have
triggered  substantial  negotiations  between  CTC,  JTC  and the govemment  for changing  the  way JTC
was  regulated.  IrrMarch  1973,  and  as a consequence  of the JPUC's  decision  not to grant  rate
increases  as desired  by the company,  the govemment  decided  to impose  a temporary  stamp  duty  tax
of 12.5%  on intemational  and domestic  calls  and to transfer  those  funds  to JTC as a direct  subsidy.4Y
As quite  an explicit  return  to that direct  subsidy  and to the GOJ  decision  to guarantee  loans,  JTC
issued  shares  and transferred  those  to the GOJ, such  that GOJ  held 10%  of JTC outstanding  stock. 4'
Following  the agreement  with  the GOJ,  JTC started  in June 1973  a new development  program.  At the
same  btme,  the license  was  amended  to provide  for a minimum  return  equivalent  to *the high  point  in
the immediately  preceding  year  of the gross  redemption  yield  of the last external  long  term loan  bonds
A  JT  claimed  tha  its investnerts were going into replacing  obsolete  and badly  mantained tacilities,  rather than  m inweaig
nominal  capcity.  See.  The Gleaner.  June 9.1971. The JPUC  also  regulatd JPS, tho olekKicity  company. A sinilar approach  o
not  graning rate inaess  unti serviee  improvemont  was achieved  was applied  for a short period  of Uims  to JPS. See,  The Glnor,
August 8. 1971.
"ThePUC  obected  to thotemporary  Stamp  Tax. In a leaert  tMinister  Bel(12/4/72) tho PUC  claimed  thatthe Stamp  Dutywas
against  the law.  as it was decded without  the putkt  having  the right  to objecL At  that time.  the govermernt  also wad  to guarante
a curtain return  to JTC (Comment  on the notes of  the Managing  Diroctor  of JTC by Ministy ot Fnance. December  1972).
*'  Soon  afer tho PNP  came to power  in l972. the company  expressed  in a meeting  with  the then Minister  of Public  Ulit  Eric
BelL  that it would  not objec to equity paitcipation by the {tate (Notes  of meeting between Miristetr elL CTC and JTC. Mrch  30,
¶972). The JPUC aso objected to the issue ot stocks  to the goverment as. it contended,  such  an bsa  wiil dilute  the ownrship
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of the Govemment  issued  in the United  l<ngdom.n  In April 1974  JTC requested  a rate increase  of
81%,  and the commission  granted  in July 1974  an average  increase  of 53%. This  was the last rate
increase  before  the takeover  of JTC by the govemment  in 1975.
49.  The introducton,  then, in 1966  of a PUC  style  regulatory  system  substantially  changed  the way
telecommunications  regulation  was undertaken.  It made  the regulatory  process  more  formal  and more
antagonistic.  While  previous  Rate  Boards  were ad-hoc  and were designed  to make  expeditious
determinations.  the JPUC  was an independent  commission,  with a permanent  staff, that was charged
with overseeing  all aspects  of the operations  of the company.  The regulatory  challenges  facing  the
JPUC  were  not simple. While  it was  given  powers  very  similar  to those  of the Public  Ublity
Commissions  of the United  States,  it had a much  less  experienced  and smaller  staff. It laced,
furthermore,  an industry  whose  accounting  procedures,  information  services,  and procurement  practices
were not  transparent.  Since  before 1967  the company  was regulated  by a Rate  Board  without
institutional  history  and with no in-house  analytical  expertise,  its accounting  and information  systems
were designed  to facilitate  control  by the holding  company  rather  than by the regulators.  Up until  the
takeover  by the government  JTC's  board  of directors  was  composed  of the who-is-who  in Jamaica's
business  and professional  elite.
so.  Against  this background,  the JPUC  was  supposed  to set rates and standards  of service. The
company's  regulatory  environment  was now totally  changed.  The company,  now,  faced  a traditonal
rate of return  system  -- yet one with no implicit  or explicit  juridically  protected  minimum  rates  of return.
Indeed.  despite  substantial  inflation,  no rate increases  were  granted  during  the period  1960-1  971.42
During  the negobations  for the transfer  of ownership  to JTC,  Continental  stated  that it believed  the
pricing  to be adequate. Soon,  though,  the company  started  to claim  that because  of the inadequate
status  of the outside  plant,  the investment  needs  greatly  surpassed  their inital expectations,  and that as
<  For eraut  btwen  3l69 and 3171  ptais doubled in Jamaica.Pa  28
a consequence  rate increases  were needed.'3 The company's claims  were received with skepbcism by
the JPUC. A series of conflicts  involving the definiton of the rate base (whether the investments
undertaken were actually proper)," on accounting  procedures (e.g., whether depreciation  should be
computed at beginning of period or at beginning  of each month), on what was the cost of capital of the
company,4 on what were reasonable  costs. and according  to Swaby (1981), on procurement
practces.4i These issues were all raised with substantial hostlity.
51.  Apart from the hostility  in the relations between  the company and the PUC, a major change
from the way Rate Boards made determinations  was the participation  of third parties in the rate
hearings.  For example, in the 1972  rate hearing, the Jamaican Tax and Ratepayers  Association (JTRA)
presented  evidence. In the 1974  rate hearing the JTRA was joined by the Jamaican Hotel and Tourist
Association  in providing evidence against  JTCs  request. Subsequent to the Commission's decision  the
JTRA filed an appeal to the Supreme CourLt' 7
52.  Another  change was the diminished role given to the Courts in the regulatory proceza. While,
as mentoned, the Supreme Court reversed in 1956  a Rate Board decision that did not allow the
5  Tne Gleaner.  June 9. 1971.
4 The  JPUCs main  cmpait  was that the rat  of expansion  of the number  ot lines was slower  than the rate of expansion  of  the
rate  base. Essentially,.  t seems  that the company  was replacing tochnically and physically  obsolete  equipment  wkhout  ye expanding
at the same rate its network.
*  Becauso  of sorne  of these disagreements,  the license  was amended  in early 1974 to sete  the way depreataion  has to be
measured.  and further  specitying  the minlmurn  Slowed rate of return.
a As mentioned  above.  Swaby  was  a consultant  tote  1950  and 1953  Rate Boards. His fleeting  comment  on the non-transprent
procurement  procedures  wer  not confirmod  by other sources  Bt  esentially  given  that JTC now faces a binding rat  eo  rattm
constraintr  the maiorily  shareholder  would have an incentive  to organize  procurerment  through its own subsidiaries  so as to transfer
profits  through overcharged  transfer prico.  This clans is not very convincing  for the JTC case as Continenta's initial hodings  were
just above  50%. The remaining  shaes were  in local  hands possible  among  the kcal board members. Furthermore,  the locI  board
members  controlled  the Boad.  For  example,  the 1971 Board  has as Chairman  and Deputy-Chairman  weU  known  business  persons.
As a consequence.  for the claim  to be valid. Continental  and the local  hoard members  have  to devise  a system whereby  puat  of the
profits  that Continental  would accrue  from transfer pricing  would be syphoned  to the board members. No one has claimed such a
collusive  arrangoment  adually was organized  in Jamaica  Parris  (1981)  caims that such trnmsfer  pricing  scheme  was organized  by
Continental  for its Trinidad-Tobago  irnvestment,  a 50-50%  govemment-Continenta.  loint  venture  Even hore,  though,  the efit  and
complexity  of the scheme  suggest  that the govemnmnt  appointed  board  members  must have bewn  pan to the scheme.
`7 As metioned above. JTC sko appealed  the JPUC dacisiorLPae  29
company to recoup  its past profits deficiency,  following the 1974  review both the JTRA and  JTC
appealed  the Commission's  decision  to the Supreme  Court  but it denied both motions.  This is the only
case  when JTC actually tried to act against  the  PUC  through legal channels. The question  remains as
to why JTC did not attempt to reverse  JPUC's decisions  in the courts.  Two aspects ot the new
regulatory  environment  may have affected the Court's implicit approach to JPUC decisions. First the
1966  license  was less forthcoming  in providing minimum  rates of retum.  The license,  however,  was
amended  in 1973.  and the next year JTC appealed  a JPUC decision. Second,  while the Rate Boards
were ad-hoc  commissions,  the JPUC was a fully staffed, semi-judicial.  organization. Thus, unless  the
JPUC violated a particular  procedural  form or clear license  stpulation. the Courts would not find it
proper  to intervene. Furthermore,  since the JPUC was directed  by political appointees.  its decisions
could be thought  to reflect the will of Parliament.4
53.  To summarze. JTC's poor performance  and lack of incentives  during the first halt of the 1970s
can be understood  in the light of two basic  factors: first, the initial condibons  under which it consented
to buy T&GTs shares. and second, the passage  and implementation  of the PUC Act. The former
implied  that JTC would have to undertake  a substantal development  program.  which to a large extent
was supposed  to be underwritten  by CTC itself.  The workings of the JPUC, however, implied  that JTC
would not want to expose any more  funds than already  done, and as a consequence  it will want  to
finance  the expansion  through rate increases, which were, in tum, restrained  by the JPUC. Thus, by
the mid-1970s  JTC's financial  situation was precarious,  and the market essentially  saw its assets as
quasi-expropriated  already. This, can be seen, to some extent, by the response  of the domestic  stock
market  to JTCs issue of new stock to the Jamaican public in 1969 and in 1973  to fulfil its
Jarnaicanization  obligations.  Both issues preceded  the PNP's  statement  of a change of policy towards
socialism. Not only did Jamaicans  shrewdly  choose not to buy the shares that were being offered, but
4" This statement,  however.  should  be  taken  with great  caulion,  as  the incident  conceming  the imposition  of a 12.5%  stamp  duty
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since  CTO  was required  to be  the underwriter  of both  issues,  by the end of the process  CTC  was
holding  68%  of the outstanding  shares,  rather  than  the 50% initially  it acquired  from T&GT."
e.  The Takeover of JTC.
54.  In 1975 CTC sold its stake  in JTC to the government.  This episode  is a key event  in the
evoluton  of Jamaica's  telecommunicatons  sector,  and,  in particular,  is most  useful  to understand  the
role of regulatory  institutions  in supporting  private  investment We will claim  that  the nationalization  of
JTC  was  iess  the result  of the ideological  shift  by the Manley  govemment  of the mid 1970s  than  of a
series  of insttutional  design  failures  of the regulatory  regime: first,  the political  changes  that occurred
surrounding  independence  seem  to have  made  telecommunications  a much  more  politicized  sector,
thus  complicating  the license  renewal  process.  The  fact that T&GT  stopped  investing  five years  before
the  expiration  of its license  shows  the uncertainty  felt by T&GT  conceming  the terms  under  which
renewal  would  begranted. Second,  the  new regulatory  system  introduced  in 1966  seems  to have
made  the regulatory  process  even  more  politicized,  substantially  disadvantaging  the firm. Third.  the
lack  of a coherent  conflict  resolution  process  between  the JPUC  and  JTC essentially  granted  full
discretion  to the JPUC,  dooming  JTC  to continuous  financial  difficulties.  Finally,  it seems  that CTCs
expectatons  about  its ability  to renegotiate  its operating  and financial  conditions  with  the GOJ  were
overly  optimistic,  exacerbating  the  financial  situation  of JTC to a precarious  level.
55.  By 1975  CTC7s  experience  in Jamaica  was  not a very happy  one. Figures  11  and 13  show  that
JTCs real profits  were  stagnant  during  the period  1970-1975,  barely  sufficient  to cover  the real
depreciation  of its assets.  The Figures  show  that only 1970  was  a profitable  year. JTC paid  ordinary
dMidends  only  in 1969. Furthermore,  as Figure  9 shows,  JTC's  value  of equity  during  the period  1969-
1975  increased  mostly  because  of the issue  of stock  to CTC  in 1973  (J$8  M in 1973,  or J$100  M at
e  Recail  fi  in 1973  JTC granted  the GOJ a 10%  owvnersip  shae  (4.5 million  shares)  a  a counterpart  for the govemwrs
dewion  to subsidize  the company  through  revenues rom  the smp-duty  tax and through  the imne ot loan guarant.Pep31
1991  prices),O  and  with  the revaiuation  of the J$ that reduced  (at least  transitorily)  the real value  of its
foreign  debt  Nevertheless,  as Figure 14  shows,  the operating  return  on  fixed  assets  did not exceed
the real cost  of its long  term debt  Thus.  CTC's  ditficulties  in attracting  capital  were not imaginary.  The
company  was not  sufficiently  prolitable  to attract  private  investors,  neither  Jamaican  or foreign. By
1971  CTC  was  already  asking  for direct  govemrnment  investrnent  in JTC. A first  step  was taken,  as
mentioned,  when  the  government  took a 10%  stake  in 1973.
56.  The government's  decision  in 1973  to support  JTC,  though,  did not go  far enough. First the
subsidy  originating  from the  stamp-duty  tax was  to end in June 1974. Furthermore,  the JPUCs attitude
towards  JTC did not change. Figure  3 shows  the  evolution  of real prices  for domestic  calls. Through
the 197111979  period  real prices  increased  in steps,  with  nominal  price increases,  granted  by the  JPUC
until 1976  and by the Ministry  of Public  Utilities  since  then,  compensating  for past domestic  inflation.
The 1971/1975  does  not seem  to be too different  from the 1975/19.  9 period  in the evolution  of prices.
In 1974,  though,  the PNP  govemment  made  pubic its change  of policy  towards  a socialist  economy,
which  included  govemment  ownership  of the main  enterprises.  This change  in govemment  atfitude
provided  JTC  with  an opportunity  to negotiate  a takeover  by the GOJ. In September  1975  CTC  agreed
to the sale of its holdings  in JTC to the govemment
57.  The final  event  on  the takeover  of JTC  was the dismantling  of the JPUC  in 1976,  and the
transfer  of regulatory  responsibilities  to the Ministry  of Public  Utilities  and Transport,  even  though  the
PUC  Act  remained  in the books. Following  the takeover,  the financial  situaton of JTC did not improve,
with  JTC showing  an economic  loss  in 1977,  after  essentially  breaking  even  since 1973  (see  Figure
11). The GOJ  pricing  policy  until 1979,  though,  did not differ  substantially  from that of the JPUC.
Figure  3 shows  no  break  in pricing  around  late 1975-1976.  Furthermore,  th.l expansion  in the network
- The issue  of now  stock  to CTC did  not involve  a new  inflow of funds  to the company,  but  rather a cancellaton of a shout  toem
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since late 1973 seems to have stopped with the takeover  as the increase in the number of main ilnes
fell during 1977-1978  as compared to 1974-1976  (see Figure 1).  Investment  fell also during the 1977-
1979  as compared to 1974-1976  (see Figure 5). As a consequence,  JTC's real economic  fixed assets
lell slightly  from 1976  to 1979 (see Figure 7).  Finally,  while consumer surplus was increasing during
the 1973)1976  period, it remained  constant, or lell, during the 1977/1980 period (see Figure 17). Thus,
the takeover  did not produce any short run positive  effect, neither consumers benefitted,  nor firms'
profitability  increased. Also, government's revenue  from the domestic  teiecommunications  sector
remained  constant,  rising only in 1980 with JTC's first income tax payment in a decade.
II.  IntematIonal Communications.
a.  Colonial  Times.
58.  International  communications  were started by the laying down of the first submarine  cable by
the West India ard Panama Telegraph  Company in 1870,  which reached Holland Bay from Cuba  The
WIPT eventually  became Cable & Wireless (West Indies), and it operated intemational  communications
until its assets  were taken over by the creation of the joint venture of JAMINTEL  in 1971.  Intematonal
communications  were not very important until the late 1970s, as revenues  from international
communications  were less than haff  those from &:mestic services.  See Figure 18.  During  colonial
times C&W operated  apparently  without a license,. 5 under a fixed price system. There is no record of
a demand by C&W  to increase prices during the late colonial  period; indeed, international
communications  prices were held constant until the late 1970s.
59.  The differences  between  the domestc and the intemational  licenses reflect both politics  and
ownership. On the one hand C&W was an imperial  (colonial) operation,  whie JTC was a privately held
company. Thus, the Jamaica-C&W  relation was, at the time, a govemment-to- govemment  relation.
"  See.  for example.  Baglehole  (1  970)  and Bartygiyng  (1979)  for  descriptions  of  the early  yeams  of Cable  and  Wiress  interatiomi
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Furthermore,  intematonal  communications  at the time  were  of very litte public  concern,  while  the users
of telephones  were  upper  and middle  class  urban  residents.  Thus,  it Is not surprising  that ratepayers
were  given  the right  to call for a Rate  Board  review  lor JTC  while  such  right  was  not granted  to C&Ws
customers.
b. Independence  and 7he  Creatlon  of JAMINTEL  (1971).
60.  JAMINTEL  was  created  in 1971  as a joint venture  between  GOJ  and  C&W,  to take  over  C&W
(West  Indies)  operations  in Jamaica  and C&W8s  1968  intemational  communications  license,  with  GOJ
holding  51  % of the  shares. The  fact  that the  joint venture  was  created  just three  years  after  C&Ws
previous  license  was  amended  suggests  that the 1968  license  was  not robust  to some  external  events.
Moreover.  JAMINTEL  itself  operated  on  terms  that left  it with  only modest  profits.  Investment,  too,  was
limited. This  episode,  then,  suggests  that  exclusive  licenses  per  se do  not provide  an answer  to the
problem  of commitment,  but rather  commitment,  if at all, comes  from the  substance  of the license
agreement,  and  of the regulatory  regime  in general.
61.  In the early 1960's  C&W  was operating  under  a license,  granted  in 1961. At that  time  it saw
the  need  to undertake  several  new  investments,  in particular,  the introduction  of an earth  station  and
the  development  of satellite  communications.  For  that purpose.  C&W  requested  a long  term  extension
of its license.52  In 1968  GOJ  extended  C&W  license  for 20 more  years,  but introduced  several  new
features  to the 1961  license. The  most  important  of these  was  the GOJ's  right  to terminate  the license
at will, in  which  case  C&W  would  be required  to seUl  all its assets  to the govemment  at an agreed  upon
price  or at a price  set by an arbitrator.  If the license  was not  renewed,  then  C&W  could  also be
required  to sell its assets  to the govemment  under  similar  conditions.  Furthermore,  the 1968  license
stipulated  that prices  were  to be  set by the Ministry,  with no minimum  but  rather  a 'fair rate  of return
allowed  to the  company.  Less  than  a year  after  the granting  of the license  negotiations  started
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between  GOJ  and  C&W (West  Indies)  for the  lormatlon  of a joint  venture  to take over  C&W  operatons
in Jamaica. In November  1970  a shareholders'  agreement  between  C&W  and GOJ  was  signed,  with
GOJ  taking  a 51%  and  C&W a 49% stake  in the venture.  The main  features  of the  shareholders'
agreement  between  GOJ and  C&W  are  described  In Table  2.
62.  There  is not much  evidence  on  what  precisely  led to the govemment  takeover  of a majority
share  of C&Ws  interests  and the creation  of JAMINTEL But  we know  that at the tme that the 1968
license  was  granted  the JLP's  nabonalistic  discourse  promoting  Jamaicanization  of the large  foreign
owned  companies  was  at Its peak. That  the JLP  wanted  to have  the option  of taking  over  not  just a
majority  share  but the  whole  enterprise  is quite  clear  from  the stipulations  of JAMINTELs  shareholders'
agreement  (see  Table  2). The  reasons  for nationalization  of the intemational  communications
operations  rather  than  its Jamaicanization"  through  private  ownership  are uncertain,  although  the
failure  of JTC's  1969  public  issue  of $4M  mnay  have  suggested  that attempts  to MJamaicanize  C&W
through  JLP's  preferred  instrument  (the  stock  market)  would  not succeed.
63.  The  joint venture  with GOJ  did not tum to be so profitable  for C&W. First,  while  the
shareholders'  agreement  seems  to suggest  that C&W  fixed assets  were  valued  at approximately
US$16M  (or  approximately  J$14M),  our  permanent  inventory  model  puts  the level  of JAMINTECs  1972
fixed  assets  at round USS20M  (see  Figures  8 and  10).  Thus  C&W  may have  given  away US$4M,  or
25%  of its fixed  assets.53  Second,  the rise  in inflation  during  the 1970s  (see  Figure  4). the maintenance
of a constant  nominal  price  for intemational  communications  (see  Figure  4), and  the change  in the
settlement  agreement  with  JTC that  regulates  the sharing  of intematonal  revenues  (in JTOs  favor  - see
below),  made  the  terms  of the shareholders'  agreement  quite  onerous  for C&W. In particular,  if we
compute  the present  value  of C&Ws investment  in JAMINTEL.  then,  we  find that  the investnent  broke
AS  we wil  le  biow. JAMINTELs  accounting  method  did not revalue  fixed  ass.  If C&W  folbwed  prwiously  to
pnodure. then t is  poeiibie  tht  much  difference  implied  tihd O&W  contibuted  more  than  i was  givn acit  for.Page 35
TABLE 2
MAIN FEATURES  OF THE SHAREHOLDERS'  AGREEMENT  REGULATING
THE CREAllON  AND OPERATIONS  OF JAMINTEL
*  JAMINTEL  was to take over C&Ws lnternational  communicatilons  licene  which was going to
expire  In 198B.  Thub.  the agrement  itsedf  was vaid only until 19W0.
*  C&W would contribute  buildings, land and equipment  for approximately  US4M
*  C&W would provide a loan of US$8 M to JAMINTEL (repayable  In 7 yeamr wih three year  of
grace, linked  to the Pound paying  8% ltorest),  which will be used (ointly wih  the Govrnments
contribution)  to buy the remaining  C&Ws aseto  and to provide  working capial.
*  The government's  contribution  of US$4 M (or J$3.4M)  woul  be provWod  through  a loan trom
C&W.  This lon  was supposed  to be repaid through  the use of up to 3/5 of the govemmenrts
recipts  trom JAMiNTELs dividends.  wihout corge  nor interest
*  Annual dividends  were not supposed  to exceed 15%  of equIty
*  JAMINTEL  was going to be directed by Jamaican  personnel.
*  The govermnent  had the option of further acqudring,  S book value, the assets of JAMINlEL
according to a prespecified  formula:
up to 60% by 1981
up to 75% by 1986
up to 100% by 1988.
even  only because  of the increase  in the value  of JAMINTEL  following  the explosion  in intemational
communications  that occurred  around  1978/1979.Y  Furthermore,  JAMINTEL's  low profitability,  and lbe
poor quality  of the local  network,  translated  in a very slow  path  of investments,  to the point  that their
fixed  assets  fell  throughout  the period.
64.  The change  in the sharing  of intemational  revenues  may  have been  the most opportunistic
acton by GOJ  in its dealing  with  C&W,  and may have  contributed  to the quasi-expropriation  of C&W
assets. Until  1979,  the sharing  agreement  between  JTC and JAMINTEL  was the same  as that between
JTC and C&W,  whereby  C&W  retained  70% of all inten:itional  revenues  while  JTC received  30%. By
Whibl  the GOJ ended repaing  its zero  inoest  debt to C&W only by 1985-1986.  rather than  the JS7M (of 1971)  that It lnt,
C&W rcenived.  in presen value sens  less than JS1 M (of 1971). C&W also  sold to JAMINTEL  half of its fed  ases  for a value
of J$7 M (of 1971).  C&W abo  rewivd  dividends for a  presnt  valueo  JS1.5 M Iof t971).  Finaly  in 1987 C&W  ctributed  lts
shares  in JAMINTEL  to  thecration  ofTOJ. lt  shares woevalued S approximalyJ115  M (of 1987).  which  o equivalnttoJ$12
Mof1971, whiInprsentvaluebecome3sapprodmtielyJ$3  .Thus  ihnpresetvalueCWnreeivedJ$13M  oriustabutSwhet
it caotribued waording to the accourting  valuation,  or JS3.3  M (20%)  less acrding  to our pormanet  inventory  modeL Al present
vau  cacbations wer  done  suming a ra  rat  ot discount  of 8%.Page 36
1979,  though, the government  was the majority shareholder in both companies.  and thus was able to
negotiate  a change in the setlement agreement  so that JTC's share increased to 40%.m  In 1984 JTC's
share was increased  to 60%, and in April 1987  It was increased to 68%.Y  Since the demand for
international  telecommunications  increased  rapidly during the 1980s, the change in the sharing
agreement  allowed  the govemment  to reduce  the portion of those rents going to C&W.
65.  To summarize,  the creation of JAMINTEL  shows that the granting of an exclusive license does
not  by itself,  facilitate private investment. Rather, what is crucial are the implications of the license
conceming govemment  discreton.  In the case at hand, GOJ had total discretion on when to cancel
C&W's license. That option most certainly was threatened to be exercised in 1969. triggering C&Ws
consent  to the creation at JAMINTEL.  in such a way that it did not provide C&W with particularly  high,
ex-post. benefits.
c.  The Boom In the Profitability  of international  Communications  and the Beginning  of the
Polfcy of Subsidization  ot the Domestic Network:19791985.
66.  As Figure 2 shows, international  telephone calls started to boom  with the introduction  of
international  direct dial from the UK  US, and Canada in 1977, and to the US and the UK in late 1978.
The growth of intemational  communications  was only slowed in 1984/1985  following the 1984 price
increases. While the growth of intemational  communications  is also connected to the size of the
domestic network. Figure 18 shows  that the increase in revenue per line that occurred since the late
1970s  is associated  mostly with an increase in intemational  revenue and number of calls per line.
The Chairman  of JAMINTEL's  bord  until  the creation of TOJ was Mr. Barber,  a  aniseor  civ  servarit who at the time of the
creation  of the company  was the Financial  permanent  secretary,  and who eventually  became  the Presidert of the Bank of Jamaica
(the  Central Bank). To what onti  JAMINTELs board represented  the interests  of the minority  shareholders  is uncertain. Mjor
changes  in the reguiatory  set-up,  though.  like changes  in the lians5,  required.  by the 1970  sharehoiders'  agreement the consent  of
C&W. The sharing  agreement though,  was an operating  decision  left to the Board. We have  no information  about  C&Ws posidon
on this issue.
I  As we will sme  blobw.  though, the  iinancial performance  of the company,  however,  started  to improve  tollowing  the 1979  prce
increase.  as JTC's network  incresd  and the demand  for Internatnal  communicalions  boomed.Pag. 37
Together  with the  increase  In international  calls,  there  were  two price increases  in intemational  services
-- 50% In 1979/1980  and a further  50% in 1984.  These  increases  reflected  the JULP's  determination,
upon  regaining  power  in 1980,  to reverse  the socialistic  policies  of the PNP. The  growth  in intemational
communicatons  plus  the price increases  drastically  increased  the profitability  of intemabonal
communications,  bringing  about  a change  in the profitability  of both  JAMINTEL  and  JTC. The year
1978  is the last one where  their  retums  to fixed  assets  were essenfially  zero  (see  Figures  11  and 12).
Since  then,  total profits  increased  rapidly. JAMINTEL's  after tax return  on fixed  assets  broke  the 10%
barrier  in 1982.  while  JTC did so in 1984. See  also Figures  19  and 20.
67.  The increase  in profitability  arising  from the boom  in international  communications,  then,
alowed all parties  to be better  off: consumers  benelitted  from an increase  in communicatons,  the
companies  benefited  from an increase  in profits  and the government  benefitted  from an overall
decrease  in its central  deficit. The  main beneficaries  of these  developments,  though,  tumed  out to be
the users  of the domestic  network.  Domestic  prices  have  been  falling  in real terms  since 1980,  even
when  taking  into account  a 1984  price increase  of 50%.  The real price decreases  appear  to be the
result  of two factors.  First,  as mentioned,  the increase  in intemational  communications,  arising  from  the
introduction  of internatonal  direct  dial, provided  a windfall  to both  companies,  allowing  their
performance  to improve  even  with  failing  real prices. Second.  the takeover  by  the GOJ  of JTC implied
that there  was  no more  pressure  from the companies  to pass  rate increases  when  their prices  were not
compensatory.
68.  While  in 1978  intemational  revenue  was just above  20% of total  revenue,  by 1985
approximately  55%  of totat  revenues  were provided  by intemational  communications,  and by 1991  the
share  of intemational  revenues  was close  to 80%. Since  intematonal  services  made.  in 1985  a directPage  38
claim  on  fixed  assets  of around  20%67  It Is clear  that  a policy  of cross-subsidization  of the  domestc
network  by the intemational  sector  developed  around  the tum of the decade." The drastc price
increase  of intemational  services  in 1979  and the  change  in the sharing  of intemational  revenues
between  the two companies  are behind  this development
69.  By 1985,  though,  the current  system  was not  sustainable.  First the zompanies' after  tax rate  of
return  on  fixed  assets  were above  30% and 10%  for JAMINTEL  and JTC respectively.  While  the latter
was not unusually  high,  JAMINTE's retums  were.  Second,  the growth  in the use  of the network  that
started  in the late 1970s  brought  about  an increase  in the revealed  demand  for main lines,  to the point
that in 19B6  there  were as many  main  lines  in held  order  as in operation. See  Figure  21. The potental
for maintaining  and increasing  the cross-subsidy  towards  the domestic  network  required  either  further
increases  in JTC's share  of intemational  revenues,  or a consolidation.  The govemment  decided  on a
consolidation  of both  companies.  Although  a consolidation  could  maintain  the  cross-subsidy,  pressure
to reduce  Fte  combined  profitability  of the companies,  which  by 1985  was above  15%  - see  Figure  13,
would  naturally  develop. This  can  be seen  from  the experience  of the electricity  sector  following  the
increase  in JPS'  profit  level  in 1984. As a consequence  of the 1984  increase  of 50%  in real  electricity
prices,  JPS'  return  on equity  exceeded  4%  for the  first  time. This profitability  level  did not last long,  as
by 1988  JPS was  already  making  losses  as its real  price  continued  to fall. See  Figure  22.
'  This  is  the shae of lAMINlELs fixed  assets  in  total  fixed mets.  Since the size  of  the domestic  network ewarly  tas  into
account  the amount  of ierndional commnunictions,  some  emourt  of JTC's  fixed  assesU  may  be directly  reated  to the  volume  of
huternatiorl communictions. By 1985,  however,  JTCVs  fixed  assets  inceased from 1979  to 1985  by  less thcn 50%  whit  intenadIonal
communiations increased  by 300% in the same period. JTC's domestc revenue  increased  during  the period  also by less than 509.
"  To  uhow  that around 1964  there  - cross-subsidization  towards  the domestic  segmern  we have to show that a) combned
profits  were normal b) domesic revenues  would  not  cover  the incremental  cost of domestic  sannice.  The first  isue can be sen  rom
thetacthat  in 19B4/1985  JTC  and JAMINTEL's  combined  real return on fixod mets  wer  around  14-16%.  Second.  the incremental
ts  of domsIc  servic  is given by  the diference ot total costs  minus  the costs of operating  the network  only for international ale.
Slince  most Intrnaiona  call  ario  from businesses.  the size of the network could be substartialy  reduced  without much ot a
reduction in irtern  tionl  cal  Thus, the incremental  cst  of domestic  service  should ba at lt  hat the arrant  costs.  Shic  by
1  9841 985  domesi  revenue  was less than half  of total revenues,  domestic  revenue  does not  cvr  its incrmental cost. suggeting
t  exisence of crosssubsidization  towards  domestic  sorvi.Pap 39
70.  The  high  level  of profitability  achieved  by the  sector,  however,  allowed  the govemment  to
transfer  the companies  to the private  sector  without  having  to increase  real prices.  This  made
privatization  politically  feasible  - in contrabt  to the power  sector  where  drastic  real  price increases
would  have  been  required  to attract  private  participation  (and  where  real returns  on equity  marginally  in
excess  of 4%  in trhe  mid-1980s  triggered  intervention  and  real price  declines. But even  with  the
increased  profitability,  private  sector  participation  in telecommunications  would  not have  been
forthcoming  without  a change  in the regulatory  system  that eliminated  the ability  of the administration  to
expropriate  the sector's  specific  assets. Once  that  was  achieved.  then,  the  ability  of the govemment  to
use  telephone  prices  for political  wealth  redistribution  became  limited.
!'
V. The Regulatory  and Structura,i  Changes  of 1987-1990.
71.  The  structural  changes  of 1987/1990  represent  major  changes  in the way  Jamaican
telecommunicabons  sector  was  regulated  and organized.  Not  only  were the insttutional  changes  the
most  important  since  the introduction  of the JPUC  in the mid  1960s,  the sector  subsequently  has
experienced  an  unprecedented  vitality. The  main  hypothesis  that  we want  to address  empirically  is that
the  performance  of the  sector  responds  to a large  extent  to the resolution  of the government/firmn
contracting  problem  through  the writing  of a regulatory  contract  that was seen  as credible  and  binding.
Furthermore,  this regulatory  contract  was  designed  so as to reduce  short  run  politcal  oppositon. In the
next  section  we explore  to what  extent  these  regulatory  changes  could  have  been  improved  upon,
given  the political,  contracting  and  structural  consbtaints.
1.  The  Creaton of Telecommunications  of Jamaica  and  the Dlvestiture of GOJ's Holdings.
72.  In 1985,  in part  for the  reasons  given  in the previous  section,  but also  because  of the coming
expiration  of JAMINTELSs  license  and of the  shareholders'  agreement  between  GOJ  and C&W,
negotiations  began  with  the intenbon  of merging  the  domestic  and intemational  operating  companies.Pap  40
In 1987  the two agreed  on the creation of Telecommunicabons  of Jamaica (TOJ) a joint venture
between  the GOJ and C&W. The shareholders'  agreement  had a few basic  components: first, the two
partners  were to contribute  to the enterprise  their shares in the two operating  companies,  with the
valuation  oi each contributon determining  their share in TOJ (and with independent  shareholders  in
JTC also receiving  shares in TOJ);  second, the two companies  were to become  wholly owned  by TOJ;
third, a rew regulatory  mechanism  was devised stpulating the ways by which the govemment  was to
set JTC and  JAMINTEL's  prices:  fourth, licenses  were to be amended  to formalize  the new regulatory
mechanism,  and  to make TOJ the licensee;  finally, a certain divestiture  of GOJ's  shares in TOJ was
also agreed  upon.
TABLE 3
MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE  1ti  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  UCENSES
a)  JTC s  ganted a monopoly  over all domacto  (both  local  and toll telephone  servie,  while  JAMINTEL
is grnted  a monopoly  over  all intematonal  commLunications
b)  Both  licenses  ae  r 25 yeas  with a renewal  penod ot 25 yers.
c)  Both  companies  are reguated  on  a rate  of return  basis,  with net  aRer-tax  (and  special  dvidends)  proft
having  to be not less  than  17.5  nor more  than  20% of (accounting)  shareholders  equity,  where  assas
a  revalued  annually;
d)  Rate stting is as folws
i)  a  the company  want5  to  adust  its tariffs, it proposes  a new  tauin  to the Minister  of Public
Utiities and Transport
ii)  i  the Miniser  accepts,  then that tariff goes in efled:
iii)  a  .e  Minis  does  not accept. and the  Mifister's  offer  is not accepted by the  Compmy,
there is a relatIvely simple abitration  procedure. with the arbitrator  having to set rates tha
satisfy  point  c) abovw
e)  TOJ is not  required to  obtain permission to  perform investments,  nor the  gwoernmen  can disallow
73.  In 1988  the shareholders'  agreement  was formalized  with the grantng of licenses  to TOJ. The
mnain  features  of these licenses  are summarized  in Table 3. These licenses  represent  a regulatory
tuming point  They  force the govemment  to maintain  the profitability  levels of the companies  at their
pre-TOJ  levels (see Figure  13). thus assuring  that their operating  retums will be sufficient  to cover their
cost  of capital (see Figure  14). While  TOJ will not be able to increase  average  real prices  as its pro-Page 41
TOJ profitability was close to the upper level of the permissible profit range, in principle it is free to
change its tariff structure, so it has an incenbive  to increase prices of the inelastic (domestic)  segments.
For this reason, upon privatizaton an agreement was reached between TOJ and the Government that
domestc rates would not be increased. 5 This agreement,  that TOJ has so far kept as domestic prices
have not been increased since 1984, had three political consequences. First, by providing incentves to
the sector to invest. TOJ has increased the rate of expansion of the local network, thus satisfying to a
large eMtent  the aspirations  of the middle class.  Second,  by focusing the increases in nominal
revenues on the intematonal segment, it has not alienated the core supporters of either party
concerning telecommunications  policy.6 '  Finally, govemment revenue through taxes has also
increased, as its average tax collection from telecommunicabons  has doubled in real terms from the
period 1981/1985 to 1987/1991.2
74.  Three issues require further discussion concerning the creation of TOJ and GOJ's divestiture.
First, the regulatory principles on which the 1988 licenses are based: second, the way the divestiture
was actually made. and finally, the possible effects that the creation of TOJ may have had on the
performance of the companies.
75.  Regulaton. The 1988 licenses created a very simple mechanism  for price adjustments and for
dispute resolution. The govemment has a short period of time to answer TOJ's requests for rate
"  While there  does not seem to exist a digned  document  an tis  respect.  insiders mentoned to us the exisence of a gontlbmons
agreement  to freeze domrstic pricm for, at leaslt five yers.  Furthermore,  in the TOJ s 1991  Annual Report,  the Chairman's  Lutw
explicXly  mentioned thart  increased revenues  from network  expansion and international  communifcafons  will alow  TOJ to maintain
ornstant  the nominal  price of domestic  communications.
- TOJ. though, has recognized  the fact that the real price  of domestic  services is too low, creating  soo large a demand  for the
network. As a consequonce.  it has  tried to increase  domestic prices  by shifting  customers' billing  away from flat service  fees towards
measured  calils.  We do not know yet the extent of tis  proce
n  Stone (1992,  pp:l 19-120)  presents  evidence  that while initially,  most JLP and middle  and upper incomo  voters  upported  the
sale  of GOJ's stock in TOJ to C&W.  most PNP and  lower income  voters opposed  iL  Since  then, though, there has ben  an inmm
in publicsupporttowrdstheGOJdivestmentof  TOJshares.  Whie  iJuly1991  54%  supportedthe policy, in March 1990onty36%
did so.  Most of the shift from negative  to positive  ocurred among  the lower  income and PNP  voters.
- From JS97M  to JS190M  hI 1991 prices.Pag  42
TABLE 4
DISTRIBUT1ON  OF OWNERSHIP  IN
7ELECOMMUNICAllONS OF JAMAICA
on Pereentages)
DAWE  GOJ  CaW  PUBLIC  PRICE IN USS
5119187  82.711  9.402  7.88  0.1811
7/23X7  72.111  20.002  7.88  0.1811
102187  53.111  39.001  7.88  0.1818
9RR188  40.00  39.002  20.99'  0.1564
7/13J89  20.00  59.002  20.99  0.2174
11C/160  0+  79.002  20.99  0.2205
*  TOJ empoyees hold 2%.
increase. It TOJ  and GOJ  disagree,  then  the issue  goes  to an  arbitrator,  who is required  to set rates
subject  to the rates  of return  specified  in the license. Furthermore,  GOJ  decisions  do  not have  to be
subject  to public  hearings.  And  TOJ  may appeal  to Jamaica's  Supreme  Court  for any violaton  of the
license. The emphasis of these regulatory  arrangements  on contract rather than on legislation  reflects,
to some  extent  the characteristics  of Jamaica's  politcal  institutions.  In the absence  of a strong
judiciary  and  the consequent  observance  of property  rights,  it is uncertain  to what  extent  this
contracting  approach  could  have  provided  the necessary  institutional  background  to promote  rapid
private  sector  paruicipation.
76. The license  stipulates  that rate  of return  is based  on shareholders'  equity  rather  than  an rate base.
As a consequence,  if the rate  of return  allowed  by the license  is higher  than  C&W's  opportunity  cost  of
funds, then C&W will have an incentive  to increase  its partcipation in TOJ, as well as for TOJ to
finance its investnents through retained earnings  rather than through long-term  debt.63
°  Sinse  chnges  in oquitry quad  operating  prafits  minus  dividends,  lar"er dividends imply  that equity  grws  less  rpidly  N  as
a cosequence  tha slowed total profits  would increase lass rapidly  as welL  Thus, by not disibutiig  its earnings  in the form  of
dividends,  TOSs  wodg  ca. tul  should  incres.  The  exces woridng  capital  could  then  be  used  to  financ t  systems  expansion.Page  43
77.  TOJ  also has a strong  monopoly  over  telecommunications  in the island,  including  the domestic
sate  of terninal equipmrent.L"  The granting  of such  strong  monopoly  illustrates  quite clearly  the impact
of the politics  of the times  on regulatory  institutions  insofar  as cross-subsidization  was used  as a way  to
obtain  political  capital  in support  ot the privatization,  at the cost,  perhaps,  of a more  dynamic  and
competitve  sector. For the govemment  to maintain,  or even  deepen,  the extent  of cross-subsidization
towards  domestic  services,  revenues  would  have to be generated  from as many  alternative  sources  as
possible.  In particular,  since  internatonal  communications  is the main  provider  of subsidies,
competibon  in the intemational  communications  sector  would  damage  the ability  to cross-subsidize.  On
the other  hand,  since  the international  communications  sector  has a relatively  elastic  demand,  achieving
revenue  from all sort  of other  sources  (e.g.  surcharges  for fax machines)  allows  the company  to reduce
the real price  of internatonal  communications  and still achieve  its rate of retum. Critics  of the licensing
arrangement  have  suggested  that it may  deter  the introduction  of new products  and  technologies.  The
cost of the cross-subsidy,  then,  is the maintaining  of a strong  monopoly  situation  in a time  when new
products  are developing  rapidly,  and  where  technological  convergence  is prevalent. 0 -
78.  Divestiture.  A number  of the other  country cases  address  the hypothesis  that the nature  of the
privatization  may  serve  as a safeguarding  insttution. In particular,  they discuss  how widespread
domestc  ownership  and multiple  providers  rather  than  a single  monopoly  may  serve  as institutional
safeguards,  as they  increase  political  support  for maintaining  private  ownership  and for restraining  the
'  Thfis  monopoly  position was hld  prevI iy  byJTC, thui  it is not a new  eature  of the regulatory process. Wile  users may
atach to the network  any equipment  they want they haveto no  the company. Ths requiremont  holds also  for fax machines,  PBXs
as wol  as for regular  tlephon  extensions. The company,  then, will add a rental chargejsurchage accwrdingly.
°  Consider.  for wampl.  the problem  that arose  when a company  wanted  lo provide  cellular  sevices in Jamaica. TOJ contended
at that time that the license  provides  it wih a monopoly  over eJI  toloemmunications services.  including  cellular, and furthermore,  that
it had alredy  perormed several investments kito collular.  The governme  eventually sided with TOJ and is presenting a bill to
Parliament  to anend the Telephone  Law to includa nan-wire  teleommuniations  in the monopoly  set.  The government  had at
least  two reans  to side with the company. Frst  even  though  the Tolephone  Law  talks about  wirecommunications. the lice  is
sibnt about  it  and the meng  of the licns.  was that the monopoly was ovr  al telecommunicati  services.  at least those  that
are  so  commonly  caled.  A second  reason  relats to the cross3-ubsidization  of the domestic  servioe.  If cellular  turns  to be  very
proitable.  then  providing  TW withthe  monopoly  overcellular  wouldallow  itto  further  reducothe  price  of intenn  communications,
reducing,  then,  the coat  of  the cross-subsidy.  If celular  services  do not  turn  to be sufficiently  profitable,  though,  then  prices  of  the
remaining  sonices  would  have  to be inreased, so  as to maidain  the minimum  rate  of return  on equity.Pap  44
government  from  directly  or indirecly  expropriating  the sector's  specific  assets. For the most  part,
though,  the  creation  of TOJ  was  not performed  in that  way. Instead,  a single  monopoly  company  was
created,  to which  a strong  monopoly  was  granted.  and ownership  was  concentrated  in a foreign
principal." At the  time of the  creaton  of TOJ,  it seems  that the intention  was  for GOJ  to retain  an
important  share  in  TOJ. But  C&W  saw  the advantages  of expanding  its ownership  share,  and
eventually  took  over  79%  of TOJ  stock. See  Table  4. Yet  some  moderate  safeguards  were  built  Into
the privatizabon.  since 13%  of the  govemment's  stockna  was  sold In a way  that  facilitated  acquisition  by
workers  and  domestic  households.  For  example,  2%  of the  outstanding  stock  (21.1  million  shares)  was
reserved  for employees,  while  51,000  residential  customers  of JTC  were  granted  priority  for up  to 1750
shares  each.9
79.  A comparison  of the  price  of  TOJ  stock  in relation  to the company's  revenues  offers  an
indication  of whether  the 1987  license  arrangements  were  viewed  by investors  as credible.  Figure  23
shows  that  until  April 1991  TOJ  shares  were being  traded  at less  than  20 US  cents.  Assuming  that  the
company  achieves  every  year  the  lower  bound  alowed  by its license  (17.5%),  we can  compute  the rate
of discount  that  would  generate  a price  equal  to approximately  US$.20.  Comparing  that rate  of
discount  with  the actual  real  rate  of interest  in Jamaica  gives  us a measure  of how  much  confidence
0 Apat trorn  C&W.  the lrgea  sharholders  e the employees  of TOJ (owning  2%  of outstanding  stock) and seven  insdiituonal
investor, none  with  a larger  stake  than  2%. The lrgest individual  shareholder  is Joseph  Mayor  Matalonm  the son of TOrs  Chairman
of TOJs Board, and also a member  of TOJ Bowd. who owns  .5% of the stock  See TOJ 1991  Annual Report
After legal cost  and  excluding  dividends  receied during  a period  of two and a half  yeas, the GOJ received  USS  1SSM.  which
after  discounting  (at  12%).  represents  USS130M.  which  is our  valuation  of GOJ-s  shares  in JTC and  JAMINTEL  as of March  87.  This.
the GOJ seems  to hava  received  a fair value  for its  es.
'  By  the  time  the prvitizAtion was completed.  the govemrnment  had  sold  all of its stock,  aside from a few nominal  shars enabl
it to keep  a represenuisve  on the Board.
'  The empbyee  shae scherm  implied  some  restridions  on resale. Employees  purchasing  shares  through  the 'employe share
scheme'  could resae frly  only  those  shars that were 'prority shures.  Discounted  shares  could be transferred  within  two ye,
o-ly to 'eligible' employees.  while  tree share  were not transfeable during  the frst two years.  Unsold 'employee  share  schem'
shares  -wo  to be retained  in a p-d  to be sold  to 'ligible  employees'  after the dose of the application  list  See TOJ prospectus.
Almost  all shares resentd lor thle  mployees  were sold, either in the first on the second round. TOJs  1991 Annuai Report  1ist
20.341.946  shares being  held by employees  thus. appWroimately  750.000  sham  that were originally  reserned  for the empblyw
remained  to be sold to employeos  by March 1991.Pag  45
investors  had in the performance  of the license.  Assuming  that  TO.' disburses  4% of its real  equity  in
the  form  of dividends,  then  a discount  rate  of 20%  ir4plies  a stock  price  equal  to US$.187  In March
198B8. Now,  in 1988  the  average  prime  lending  rate  was 23%,  while  the rate  of devaluation  for the
year  was zero  implying  a real rate  of interest  (in US$)  of 23% minus  the US  inflation  rate (about  4%).
Thus,  a real  discount  rate  of 19%  for the private  sector  was  quite  reasonable  for Jamaica  in 1988. A
real  discount  rates  of 19%  would  imply  a value  for TOJ  shares  as of March  1988  of US$.212,  a bit
higher  than  the price  of the public  sale,  but exacty  equal  to the price  paid  by C&W  In the two  latest
acquisitions."  The  similarity  between  the market  valuation  of TOJ  and an estimate  of the value  of TOJ's
stock  on  the assumption  that the license  holds  for its complete  period,  provides  support  to the
hypotheses  that  the 1987  regulatory  regime  was  seen  as credible  by investors.
80.  Impact  on performance.  The movement  towards  the creation  of TOJ  and the introduction  of the
1988  licenses  has  implied  large  changes  in the  way  the  sector  operates. First,  Figure  4 shows  that
since  the negotatons  for the creation  of TOJ  were  started  in 1985,  the real price  of international  calls
has  ceased  to decline,  and  has  remained  more  or less  constant Second,  the profitability  of the
companies  has  been  systematically  high  (see  Figures  11-13),  but  well within  the  license-prescribed
range. lThis  high  level  of profitability  has  allowed  the companies  to increase  their  level  of investment.
The increase  in  the number  of main  lines  has  been  quite  rapid,  as has been  the increase  in the value
of the network's  fixed  assets. See  Figures  1 and 5 to 10. As can be seen  in Figure  9, furthermore,  the
increase  in profitability  has  allowed  JTC to finance  a large  part  of its investments  through  long  tenn
debt.
XThis  number  is gneraeod as follows:  Take K, to be the value (in USS)  of TOJ equity per share  as of Mardc 1991. The price
of a share  in TOJ is given by: P a ZZ65,d/(1  )+14.C(1  .6),  whore  6 is the discoum  rate. K, Is the value of equity  as ot peiod t.  , 
K,,'(l+.175)-d, where  d, reprosenrt  th  dividend  distribution  in period  t, with dA=K,,04.
n  Slghy  lower  raes of discount  Imply  substaWially  higher prices. For example.  a rate of discunt  ot 15%  would Imply  a 3188
pran of USS37, almos 100%  above  the public  sale pricePage  46
81.  Tie increase  in the  size  of the network  has  implied  substantial  welfare  gains  for consumers.
We  can  decomposa  'he  change  in welfare  as the  sum  in the  changes  in consumer  surplus,  govemnnent
revenue' and  fams'  profits. Changes  in consumer  surplus,  for each  segment  - intemational  and
domesbc  - have  two  sources:  first, changes  in prices  faced  by consumers, 73 and  second,  increases  in
the network. 4 Figures 15  and 16  show  that untl 1987,  changes  in consumer  surplus  from  network
expansion  were  almost  always  positive,  and of the order  of J$50 Million  (in 1991  J$) per  year.
Increases  in consumer  surplus  doubled  to J$100M  for 1988-1990,  and in 1991  reached  $350M. Figure
15  also  shows  that  until  1987,  changes  in consumer  surplus  from network  expansion  were  more  or less
evenly  divided  between  domestic  and  intemational  services,  but  following  1987  the  great  majority  of the
gains  come  from  intemational  services.  Figure  17  presents  the annual  changes  in total  net surplus,  in
its division  among  consumers,  govemment  and  the  firms. Through  the 1  970s  changes  in net total
n  vrnment's  revenu,  fram indirec  taxs is estimated.  Government  revenu from  incme  tax Is  providd  by  the  companie'
annual  reports Govwrnmes  Income  from  its  shar of  the  dividends  riLstributed  by  JAMINTEL  appeas  as put of  the  changs  in  the
profitabilky  of  the  compnies.
'  'his  ogta  Is simpiy  the Skaz  oyfec,  and can be computed  as -hPO. where  aP refiect  the ineroe  in rea price
from  year  to  year.  and  0 refes  the  previous  yeaes  quantity.
'4 BeAUse  JanIaicns'  accoss  tothe toelohone  network  is consrained by the availability  of ties,  increases  hi lines repents
an  upwad  shift  in  the  demnd curve  for  the  network.  Consequently.  holWing  constat  the  quantty  of  calls an  increase  in  the  number
of lnes  increases  tota consumer  surplus  by the  are  under  the two  curves.  This rea can  be approxmated  (assuming  a linear
demand)  by  the change  in  the number  of lines  times  the eolsticy  of  the  inverse  demand  for  the  senrice  times  the  enrage revenue
per  line. We estimated  log  liner inwrso  demands  tor  both  domesic  and  internotional  services  lor the period  197211991.  The
estimated  equations.  correcting  for  serial  correlaion,  are s fllow
Log  Log
Irnt Pric  Domesic  Prkc
Constant  -10  A2  8.75
(4.96)  (43
Log  ReWi  tIl  -. 64
Output  (24)
Log  Real  Domesi  - -2.01
Output  (.29)
Log ines  1.75  1.43
(.58)  .52)
Trend  (Post  1980)  -. 007  -.008
(.02)  (-.01)
Stndard erors in parerethe
We  use  these  estimated  oquatons  compute  the  gains  frorn  changes  in  the  number  of  lines  from  domestc  and  intmational  service.
Obsme  that  wo  estimate  the  demand  for  international  services  to be  mwre  elasi than  the  demnd for  domestic  srnves. There  w
two  reasos  trthis  first the  growth  in demand  for  intrnational  communications  by  households  increased  since  19799  Swend.  and
mor importw0y.  Is  the  way  irtemationa  and  domestie  calls - charged  Whie international  cals - charged  by  the minute,  the
pricing  system  for  local  eals  difets across meas Jamaia with  most  households  paying  morthty  ft  service  ees,  plus  ihteciy toi
dcarges Ma consequence,  unless  substantial  toll ails ae made,  the  measured  easticity  of  the  domestic  demand  woLid  be  woer
than  that  for  intrnational  searviepag 9 47
surplus  were  barely  positive  (seldom  exceeding  J$100M  in 1991  prices). Firms,  and the government
have  small  annual  gains  compared  to those  of consumers.  Note  that the  consumer  welfare  measure
does  not  take  into  account  several  developments,  all of which  should  provide  additional  welfare
increases.  First,  the  company  has  been  installing  fiber  optic  cables  around  the island  and  within  all
Kingston  exchanges.  Second,  the island  has  been  almost  fully  converted  to digital  technology.  Third,
cellular  telephony  was  introduced  in late 1991  (our  1991  measures  go up to March  1991).
82.  Undoubtedly,  then,  the post 1987  period  has  been  good  for consumers,  the firms and  the
govemment.  To what  extent  this  welfare  increase  could  have  been  repficated  without  the  creation  of
TOJ  and its privabzation  is unclear.  While  Figures  5 and 7 show  that there  was  a drastic  increase  in
investment  in the domestic  network  in fiscal  years  1990  and 1991,  after  the privatization,  a live years
capital  expenditure  project  of US$600M  was  announced  by the Minister  of Public  Utilities  and  Transport
in 1988,  before  VTre  public  issue  of shares,7  to be  financed,  in part, by a loan  of the Government  of
Japan. Eventually,  these  negotiations  ended  with  the Overseas  Economic  Corporabon  Fund  of Japan
providing  a loan  for US$62M  to cover  equipment  bought  from  Japanese  suppliers.  Whether  the larger
program  could have  been  implemented  under  the pre-1987  regime  is unclear.  The history  of the  JTC
includes  several  deveiopment  programs  that  went  nowhere,  as financing  and pricing  problems  delayed
or preempted  their  implementabon.  On the other  hand,  the 198711988  regulatory  change  provided  the
company  with  a relatively  stable  regulatory  envirunment  that could  have  facilitated  the implementabon
of such  a large  expansion  program,  even  without  the ownership  changes.
83.  As for the intemational  network,  all through  the 1970s  and 1980s  JAMINTEI's  rate  of
investment  had been  relatively  slow,  with  working  capital  increasing  during  the 1980s,  to the point  that
at the end of the decade  its working  capital  exceeded  its fixed  assets.  This experience  suggests  that
neither  C&W  nor GOJ  found  it profitable  (or  could)  extend  their  exposure  in the company.  As Figures  6
7lb  Gleanr.  Apri  18, 1988.Page  48
and B show, the pos!.  1t.88 experience  has been quite different, with  TOJ stardng  a  rapid process  of
development  of the inter- atlorial network. The implication  is that the combination  of privatization  and
regulatory  reform provided C&W with incentives and confidence  to Invest  in Its Jamaican operaton
which the company  did not have prior to 1987.
I.  An Assessment  of the Regulatory  Reforns of 1987.
84.  In this section we analyze the extent by which the regulatory changes  of 1987 could have been
instrumented  better. We discussed  above several shortcomings  of the regulatory changes  of 1988  and
of the way the privatization  was undertaken. We can classify them in three groups:  competition,
pricing and ownership policies. The regulatory and structural changes of 19B7  provide for a total lack
of competition  even in the more dynamic segments of the sector; maintain  a policy of cross-
subsidization  towards  the domestic/household  segment,  and a generally inefficient  pricing scheme;  the
eniasis in the privatization  process  on direct sales rather than public offerings  provide for ownership
concentration  in a foreign concern with limited domestic ownership. Aul  these features have, on the one
hand, non-trivial  income redistribution  aspects. and may, also, impair the evolution of the sector in the
future.
B5.  It is easy to describe an altemative, more efficient  set of regulatory changes.  The 1987
regulatory  change could have provided  TOJ with monopoly  over the basic  local network, but allowed
competition  everywhere  else; instituted  a flexible pricing scheme with small administrative  discretion
(e.g. price caps); and provided  for widespread  domestic ownership. This scheme  would have, on
paper,  looked much more efficient given the rapid technological  change in value added and long
distance  communications,  would have, in principle, provided  TOJ incentives to innovate and to reduce
its costs, and would have, also in principle, provided  for widespread political  support for maintaining  the
privatization  process. In this section we explore whether these three schemes could have been
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86.  Consider,  first, the decision  to provide  TOJ  with a total monopoly  over  all telecommunications,
both  domestc  and Interantional.  We discussed  already  the politcal costs  of introducing  competition  In
value  added  and long  distance  communicatons  (Including  International),  and thereby  undercuttng  the
possibilities  of cross-subsidization.  These  costs,  though,  depend  on the extent  of competitlon  that Is
allowed. If Internatlonal  communications  had been  left In the monopoly  sector,  but competition  allowed
in the provision  of value  added  services  and terminal  equipment,  then  the extent  of cross-subsidization
may not have been  impacted  so heavily  and the costs  of reduced  revenue  could  have  been  smaller.
The Jamaican  govemment  chose  an extreme  point  on  the competitlon-monopoly  spectrum,
87.  While  a more  narrow  monopoly  franchise  could  have  been  granted,  It would  have  required
some  more  instiutional  de;iyn. In particular,  a narrow  monopoly  franchise,  may  grant  the
administrabon  (ex-post)  discreton  on the definition  of what the local/monopoly  segment  is.  For
example.  assumrthat the monopoly  is just for the local  network. In that case,  should  fiber-optic  cables
be considered  part of the network?" Should  large  users  be allowed  to by-pass  the network? Should
cable  TV be considered  part of the network7 While,  in principle,  providing  regulators  with  flexibility  on
these  and related  matters  could  motivate  the firm to adopt  proper  pricing  and to innovate,  administrative
discrebon  could  also be  used by the regulators  to expropriate  the compants quasi-rents.  To
counterbalance  the extent  of administrative  discrebon,  a conflict  resolution  process,  like arbitration,
could,  in principle,  be developed.  Altematively,  the license  could  have defined  precisely  the boundary
between  competitive  and monopolistic  sectors.  Here,  one opton would  have  been to define  precisely
the  set of activities  that are  open  for competton,  such  that what  is not explicitly  mentioned  is granted  to
TOJ. Thus,  terminal  equipment,  value  added  services,  cellular,  cable  lV, and even  intemational
communications,  could  have been  carved  out of TOJ  monopoly.  A second  option  would  define
precisely  what  TOJ  has monopoly  over  and would  open for competition  whatever  is not explicitly
mentioned.  Although  undertaking  a more  pro-competitive  policy  would  have limited  the opportunites  for
M  ihbis  Ls  not a thoorsimcl  question.  See  the dicussion in footnote  65.Pgp 60
cross-subsidization  and  thereby  had a short  run political  cost,  the fact  that the GOJ  pursued  a total
monopoly  policy  was,  to a large  extent,  a missing  opportunity.  Observe,  however,  that reducing  the
extent  of the legal  monopoly  would  have  fiscal  implications,  as private  investors  would  have been
willing  tn pay  less  for the company.  Thus,  while  society  could  have bonefitted  1rom  a more  rapid
technological  change  and introduction  of new products  under  a more  narrow  monopoly  stipulation,  it
would  have  paid  up-front  with  a reduction  in the revenues  collected  from the privatizaton. Given  the
rapid  technological  change  in this  segnent of the industry,  such  a societal  tradeoff  seemes  worth
taking.
88.  Consider,  now,  the total  liberalization  of intemational  or long  distance  calls. In principle,  access
pridng  to the local  network  could  have  been  designed  so that TOJ's revenues  from intematonal
operations  would  still be subsidizing  the local  network,  so as to limit  the poflitical  cost  Since  TOJ  would
retain  the monopoly  on the local  network,  access  charges  would  naturally  be  regulated.  To restrain  the
potential  for administrative  discretion,  though,  access  charges  would  have  to be included  as part of the
rate  of return  system  actually  implemented.  But then,  competition  would  not have  driven  prices  down,
substantially  limiting  the gains  from the liberalization  of the intemational  calls  segment.
89.  Consider,  now,  the introducton  of altemative  pricing  schemes.  There  are several  pricing
schemes  that could  be implemented.  The  one chosen  in Jamaica  was  a rate of return  on equity,
whereby  the company  requests  rate  increases  wherever  it believes  its rate  of return  is not on  the target
zone. Disagreements  with  the GOJ  are settled  through  binding  arbitration.  While  this pricing  scheme  is
behind  the current  incentives  to invest,  it also does  not provide  enough  incentives  to reduce  costs. A
more  flexible  pricing  scheme,  however,  may  - given  Jamaica's  politics  and political  structure  - have
increased  contracting  costs  between  the govemment  and the company. Consider,  for example,  the
introduction  in the license  of a price-cap  system. Price-cap  systems  operate  as automatc  adjustments
to prces over  a base-price  fixed  ahead  of time. Price-cap  systems  have  so far been instituted  for aPa-  G1
limited  period  of lime since,  in the absence  of periodic  adjustments,  they will most probably  lead  to
extremely  high  or extremely  low returns.  Price-cap  revisions,  however,  provide  substantial
administrative  discretion,  and in the absence  of a minimum  expected  rate of retum. may  provide
incentives  for the regulators  to expropriate  the firm's  quasi-rents.  As this paper  has  shown.  Jamaica's
political  institutions  are such  that administrative  discretion  appears  to be incompatible  with attracting
private  investment,  undercutting  the viability  of prce-cap  regulation  in the Jamaican  institutional  setting.
90.  Consider,  finally,  the way the GOJ  disposed  of its stake  in TOJ. It is clear that at the bme  of
the public  offering,  GOJ  was interested  in achieving  widespread  stock  ownership  by domestic  residents.
For example,  the price  of J$.88  was  consciously  chosen  by the government  so as to assure  the total
placement  of its stock," and,  as discussed  above,  there  were  also special  priority  arrangements  for
household  customers  of JTC and for TOJ employees.  Yet in practice  the sale  of GOJ's  remaining  stock
to C&W  went  against  widespread  ownership.  These  sales  mey have been  triggered  by two important
reasons: first,  as mentioned  above,  JAMINTEL's  experience  showed  that C&W involvement  by itself
does not assure  strong  C&W investnents,  even  when  it had  almost  50% of the shares. Second.  during
1988/1989  there  were  strong  fiscal and foreign  exchange  pressures  that may  have  convinced  the
govemment  to sell its shares  to a willing  and ready  buyer. The  fact that C&W  was  willing  and ready,
though,  shows  the power  of the licensing  arrangements.  If conflict  with the govemment  develops,
though,  the ownership  structure  of TOJ will not provide  it with extra  political  capital  to counter  the
administration's  side. Thus,  it is possible  that a few years  before  license  renewal  tme. TOJ may
iationally  forecast  poitical problems,  and restrain  its investment  program,  triggering  perhaps,  an early
renewal  of the 1988  license. On the other  hand,  a more  widespread  stock  ownership  could,  in
principle,  have  sewved  as a safeguard,  and could  have  made possible  a less  rigid regulatory  scheme
than the one  spelled  out in the 1987  shareholders'  agreement Observe,  however,  that widespread
ownership  is not assured  without  restrictions  on ownership  of shares,  as domesbic  residents  could
'  PrIrate  conersation  wit  Rkhad Downer,  consulant  to  the GOJ  an the privatiorLPage  52
easily end up selling  their shares overseas,  fully eliminating  the advantages of widespread  ownership
as a safeguard?7'
91.  To summarize,  first, because of the ried  to restrain administrative discretion, it is not at all
clear that a very flexible pricing scheme could have been designed so that it would have produced
drastically better cost efficiencies. To a  large extent, given the nature of Jamaican politics and political
structure, the license provision of a minimum rate of return seems to be crucial for assuring
performance,  tnus restricting the type  of incentive mechanisms  that may be able to be used.
Furthermore,  our discussion  above  suggests that the range of allowed returns does not seem to be
much above C&W`s  altematve use of funds, and thus this range may not be excessive. Second, as
long as the pelitical  will to cross-subsidize  domestic communications  remains strong, competition  in
long distance and intemational  communications  would be constrained. Thie. however, may eventually
translate in a large social cost as the segments that cross-subsidize  domestic  rates are among the
most technologically  dynamic segments of the sector.  Furthermore,  realignment  of rates prior to the
privatization  may have substantially  damaged public support for the privatization process.  Finally, while
GOJ could have tried to sell its stake in TOJ to the public rather than to CMW,  it is uncertain  whether in
the long run diffused  domestic ownership  would have remained, given the openness of Jamaica's
capital markets. Thus, the 1987 regulatory  change seems to have erred in the preservation  of a tight
monopoly  over all telecommunications  segments. While allowing competition  in some segments of the
market would have required some i'Raiignment  of rates  with a possible short term political backlash,  it
could have had long term benefits in the form of a more dynamic sector and lower prices in a quite
elastic segment  of the market. This, to a large extent, represents the missing opportunity in the whole
regulatory change/privatization  process.
I For  example. in early 1967 Jama_cns  owned 9.1% of JTC.  Shortly after CTCs  acquisition  of T&GT sham,  th  Now York
Stock Exhange  quMin  of  JTC shares increased, and Jamaicns  !old JTC shares  to the paint  thd by the end  of 1969 5% of  the
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VI. FAnal  Comments.
92.  The  evolution  of Jamaica's  telecommunications  regulatory  and ownership  institutions  provide  a
fertile  experience  to explore  some  of the main  hypotheses  as to the  relatons  between  regulations,
Institutions  and economic  performance.  We have  provided  evidence  as to the importance  of Jamaica's
political  structure  in  the development  of regulatory  institutions  and on  their  performance  implications.  A
major  result  Is  that  given  the nature  of Jamaica's  parliamentary  system  with  a strong  two party  system,
with  very  little  independence  of Individuals  members  of parliament,  decentralized  decision  making
based  on strong  - statutory  based  - procedural  requirements  may  not provide  the necessary  regulatory
stability  to promote  private  sector  investment  in sectors  characterized  by sunk  investments  and
domestc  consumpton.  Furthermore,  very  flexible  regulatory  schemes  with  strong  incentves.  a-la UKI
may  not  be feasible  either  as, given  the nature  of polifics  and  ownership  of the ublities,  political
opportunism  may  be  unavoidable.  The  Jamaican  telecommunications  sector  may  have  found  an
intermediate  waylhat while  restraining  administrative  discretion,  provides  strong  incentives  for
investment  and restrains  prices  at their  initial,  although  quite  distorted,  average  levels. This outcome,
however,  was  politically  feasible  because  of the increase  in international  communications  that  occurred
in the late  1970s  and  allowed  the  sector  (mostly  the intemational  firm)  to achieve  high  levels  of
profitability  without  having  to increase  prices. Privatizaton,  then,  was  Teasible  and,  to a large  extent
painless.
93.  The  Jamaican  regulatory  system  is based  on a license  which  stipulates  a price  setting
mechanism.  Prices  have  to be  such  that the company  achieves  a particular  rate  of return  on  equity. A
very  specific  procedure  is spelled  out,  which  triggers  arbitration  would  discrepancies  appear.
Furthermore.  GOJ  violabon  of the  license  can be  appealed  to the Jamaican  Supreme  Court  for breach
of contract.  The  feasibility  of this regulatory  system  is based  on the independence  of Jamaica's
judiciary,  its common  law  tradition  and respect  for contracts  and property  rights,  including  the  fact  that
the  final  appeal  level  is with  the Privy  Council  in London.  Thus,  the Jamaican  experience  may  not  bePag.  54
easily  transferable  to other  developing  counties  where  the  Courts  are  much  less  politically  independent
and  professional.
94.  The  regulatory  reform  of the late 19BOs,  however,  could  have  been  done  better,  albeit  at a
short  run  political  and fiscal  cost. In particular,  the  maintenance  of a strong  monopoly  over  all
telecommunications  segments  was  not necessary  to support  the development  of the network  based  on
private  ownership.  It would  have,  however,  reduced  the extensive  cross-subsidy  towards  the domestic
segment,  and  reduced,  perhaps,  public  support  towards  the privatization.  On the other  hand,  it could
have  promoted  the development  of a whole  array  of new  products  and services,  and increased  the
compebtiveness  of Jamaica's  export  oriented  sectors.  That  GOJ  did not  open  up those  segments  for
compebton,  attests  to the need  for more  careful  design  of regulatory  institutions  that  take  into  account
both  the politics  and political  structure  of the country  and  the economic  and  technological  issues  in
telecommunicaions.Page  65
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